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I.  WHEN SCORES ARE WRONG 
A.  High Stakes 
Hopes and dreams often hinge on the accuracy of standardized test 
scores. Results frequently determine, or greatly influence, whether a student 
progresses to the next grade level,1 attains a diploma,2 gains admission to a 
college or university,3 or can practice a profession after graduation. Prudent 
expenditure of public and private resources also depends upon the accuracy 
of standardized test scores. Unless test results are correct, elementary and 
secondary schools may lose state or federal funding,4 such as cash bonuses 
for superior performance,5 or may incur added costs of providing required 
                                                                                                                             
1. High Stakes, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Apr. 2, 2006, at 2P (stating that wrong 
standardized scores in Florida can deny “third-grade students the right to advance to fourth 
grade”). 
2. See Blakely Latham Fernandez, Comment, TAAS & GI Forum v. Texas Education 
Agency: A Critical Analysis and Proposal for Redressing Problems with the Standardized 
Testing in Texas, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 198 (2002) (indicating that, in Texas, “over a 
hundred thousand students, primarily minorities, otherwise qualified to graduate have been 
denied diplomas and other opportunities for economic and social success because they failed 
to pass [a required] standardized test”). 
3. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99150(a)(2) (West 2002) (stating the legislature’s 
finding that “[s]tandardized tests are a major factor in the admission and placement of students 
in postsecondary education”). 
4. See Sam Dillon, Most States Fail Demands Set Out in Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 2006, at A5 (discussing the potential loss of federal funds under a law that 
emphasizes performance measured by standardized testing). 
5. See Jenny LaCoste-Caputo, Hold Slapped on TAKS Bonuses, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 17, 2006, at 1A (discussing standardized tests in Texas). 
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remedial programs.6 If scores are understated, teachers may be paid less7 or 
even lose their jobs.8 Just as importantly, if test scores are inaccurate, 
scholarship dollars may be awarded to the “wrong” applicants, frustrating 
oft-painstaking efforts to allocate limited resources wisely and denying 
students opportunities they otherwise would merit. Because standardized 
tests are relied upon in professional credentialing, such as teaching 
certification9 and admission to the bar,10 erroneous scores pose a further risk 
that the public will not be protected from deficient practitioners and that 
qualified aspirants will be barred from their callings. 
                                                                                                                             
6. See Jenny LaCoste-Caputo, Feds See Things Looking Up at Schools in the S.A. 
Area, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, at 1A (discussing how schools with bad 
standardized test results under the federal No Child Left Behind law can be obliged to pay for 
tutoring or transporting students to better-performing schools); Tiffany Lankes, Once, Only 
Teachers Examined Student Test Results; Today, Everybody’s Watching: Colleges Drill 
Standardized Testing Skills to Student Teachers in Era of Accountability, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIB. (Fla.), June 18, 2006, at A1 (stating that under the federal No Child Left Behind law, 
which requires standardized testing in elementary and secondary education, “schools that 
receive federal funding because they have a high number of poor students have to pay for 
mandatory remedial programs if they don’t meet the goals”). 
7. Stuart Silverstein, Standardized Tests Don’t Always Make the Grade, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2006, at 32, available at 2006 WLNR 6958920 (“In K-12 education, [standardized 
tests] help make such determinations as school rankings, teacher licensing and pay, and 
whether students graduate high school.”). 
8. See LaCoste-Caputo, supra note 6 (discussing “reconstitution” of a school with bad 
test results under a process where teachers are fired and forced to reapply for their jobs). 
9. Cf. Daniel Austin Ortiz, Comment, Innocent Until Proven Guilty? Not If You’re 
Teaching Me: A Texas Teacher’s Right to Procedural Due Process, 8 SCHOLAR 95, 104 
(stating that, under an examination administered to current Texas educators, “teachers forfeit 
their certification if they fail to achieve a satisfactory score on the standardized test”). 
10. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Common Ground in Controversial Territory 
There are endless disputes over the merits of standardized testing.11 
Critics often argue that such evaluation instruments test the wrong skills or 
knowledge.12 Civil rights advocates contend that standardized examinations 
are biased against minority test-takers13 and members of other disadvantaged 
                                                                                                                             
11. The value of standardized testing is, to some extent, a matter of context.   
“Corruption, in the form of bribes to gain university entrance or pass exams, was endemic in 
higher education in the Soviet Union and persists in virtually all post-Soviet states.” Vera 
Rich, Law Shift Could Trap Dissenting Lecturers, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPP., Aug. 4, 2006, 
at 10. Today, reformers in those countries promote the use of anonymous standardized testing 
to fight corruption in admissions decisions. See Renata Kosc-Harmatiy, Fulbright Ukraine 
Discusses the Idea and Relevance of the University, in FULBRIGHT UKRAINE 2004, at 102 
(Myroslava Antonovych ed., 2004) (discussing a conference in Ukraine), available at 
http://www.fulbright.org.ua/yearbook2004.html; see also F for Fairness: Prosecutor’s Report 
Card Finds Universities Failing to Fight Corruption, TIMES OF CENT. ASIA (Kyrg.), Aug. 3, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 13378109 (“[A]n anonymous testing system, whereby every 
entrant is given a separate number, and tests are run in parallel on the same day nationwide. . . 
. is widely applied in Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and some other countries. . . . 
[although] Tajikistan hasn’t tried it so far.”).  
12. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self Interest? 10 
Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good Law Schools 
Should Follow 
Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 598 (2001) (“[M]any [standardized] tests do not test all 
relevant skills. The LSAT, for example, only requires verbal and reasoning fluency, not the 
ability to command probability, scientific reasoning, humanistic thought, historical thought, or 
knowledge of human motivation and psychology––all skills important for lawyers.”); Leigh 
Jones, Bar Examiners Craft Key to Lawyers’ Fate, NAT’L L.J., July 28, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id=1153991134010 (indicating that the 
Multistate Bar Exam has been criticized on the ground that it “bears little relationship to the 
practice of law”); see also Michael Winerip, Standardized Tests Face a Crisis Over 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at B7, available at 2006 WLNR 4711014 (discussing 
concerns over whether requirements under federal law “pressure . . . states to dumb down their 
tests”). 
13. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, A General Theory of Cultural Diversity, 7 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 33, 56 (2002) (“It is . . . clear that much of the divergence in the ‘qualifications’ of 
minority group members versus ‘Caucasians’ is directly attributable to standardized tests.”); 
David J. Trevino, Comment, The Currency of Reparations: Affirmative Action in College 
Admissions, 4 SCHOLAR 439, 454 (2002) (asserting that “in general minorities do not perform 
as well as non-minorities on standardized exams” and, therefore, “one may argue that these 
scores serve as a proxy for race”); Student Sues Over SAT Scoring Snafu, WOMEN IN HIGHER 
EDUC., May 1, 2006, at 4, available at 2006 WLNR 8977903 (quoting a representative of 
FairTest, a nonprofit group that advocates de-emphasizing the importance of standardized 
tests, who claims that colleges that do not require the SAT “report getting more applicants and 
[have seen] an increase in those from minority and low-income students, without a decrease in 
academic performance”); see also NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
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groups.14 Critics also plausibly assert that the widespread availability of 
costly test preparation courses skews results in favor of those who can afford 
them and thereby undermines the value of standardized testing.15 
Despite these concerns, everyone agrees that if standardized tests are 
given, they should be scored consistently and accurately. If answer “C” is the 
“right” choice for a question, then “C” must be the right choice for every 
student who answers that question.16 If a hundred students all select identical 
answers on the same standardized test, they should all receive the same 
scores. Anything else would violate deeply held American ideals of equal 
treatment,17 consumer protection,18 and fair opportunity19––not to mention 
intellectual honesty. 
                                                                                                                             
THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY 155-57 (1999) (discussing the “Negro problem” in the 
development of the Scholastic Aptitude Test); Fernandez, supra note 2, at 150-67 (discussing 
equal protection, due process, and Federal Civil Rights Act challenges to “high-stakes 
testing”). 
14. Cf. Scott Weiss, Contemplating Greatness: Learning Disabilities and the Practice 
of Law, 6 SCHOLAR 219, 243-51 (2004) (discussing standardized testing of bar applicants with 
dyslexia and other disabilities); see also LEMANN, supra note 13, at 227 (stating that Allan 
Nairn’s 1980 report accused the Educational Testing Service of using standardized testing as 
“an official way for people with money to pass on their status to their children”); Karen 
Mellencamp Davis, Note, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a Constitutional 
Remedy When Schools Fail To Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123, 1159-60 (1994) 
(asserting that most standardized tests are biased against females). 
15. See LEMANN, supra note 13, at 222 (discussing complaints about the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test in the 1970s: “Kids with rich parents would take Stanley Kaplan’s course and 
their scores would go up”); see also Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 
F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2004) (reviewing claims by the provider of medical school 
aptitude test against a test preparation service). 
16. As the illustration suggests, this Article is mainly concerned with the mis-scoring of 
objective-style standardized questions that offer alternative answers. However, some 
standardized tests include an essay component, and, in some instances, mis-scoring 
complaints relate to that section of the test. See infra Part II.A. 
17. “The search for social equality [was] a dominant theme in twentieth century 
America.” Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 717, 745 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson, America’s Preoccupation]. See generally 
Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 25, 32 & n.33 (2000) (asserting that “[i]n contemporary America, equal 
treatment is highly prized, as is reflected by the ubiquitous invocations of ‘equal protection,’ 
‘equal justice under law’ and ‘equal opportunity’” and citing case law statistics (citations 
omitted)). Today, “in the public sector, anything which gives one person a competitive 
advantage over another in pursuing the benefits and resources that government can provide is 
ethically suspect.” Id. at 32. “[T]he essence of American greatness was a quality that Alexis 
de Tocqueville had remarked upon early in the nineteenth century: social equality, of a kind 
that would be unthinkable in any other country.” LEMANN, supra note 13, at 7. 
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C.  Vast Expansion of Standardized Testing 
Today, standardized testing is widely employed in the United States20 
and abroad.21 Although standardized tests have been used in America since at 
least the 1920s,22 the field of standardized test preparation, administration, 
and scoring grew “enormously”23 after President George W. Bush signed the 
No Child Left Behind Act24 in 2002, catalyzing the demand for such 
evaluative instruments at the state level. This federal law requires that a very 
wide range of public school students “be annually tested in math and 
                                                                                                                             
18. See Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 17, at 749-50 (discussing the rise 
of consumer protection in America during the twentieth century). 
19. “Opportunity is the great onrushing force in American society, the thing that every 
single person is supposed to have as a fundamental right and whose denial is morally 
unacceptable.” LEMANN, supra note 13, at 155. 
20. See, e.g., Mark Johnson, N.Y. Senator Subpoenas Execs Over SATs, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, July 11, 2006 (“The College Board administered 9 million college entrance exams last 
year, collecting $500 million in revenue”); cf. Editorial, The School Testing Dodge, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at 49, available at 2006 WLNR 11419790 (discussing how state and 
federal standardized tests are used to measure achievement in math and science). 
21. See Joseph L. Pratt, The Two Gates of National Taiwan University School of Law, 
19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 150-58 (2001) (discussing the series of exams that students 
take from middle school on to determine what field of study they will pursue); Sang-Hyun 
Song, Legal Education in Korea and the Asian Region, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 398, 398 (2001) 
(referring to a qualifying exam administered by the Korean national government which is 
roughly comparable to the SAT in the United States); Barry Sautman, Affirmative Action, 
Ethnic Minorities and China’s Universities, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 77, 86 (1998) (“In 1996, 
the national entrance examination had a total of 750 points, but because competition for 
university places in China is fierce, a single point can make a difference in seeking admission 
to higher education in general or to a student’s university of choice.”); Jin-Ah Yoo, A Race to 
Educate Earning Mixed Grades: S. Korean Moms’ Aggressiveness Doesn’t Score High With 
Critics, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), Nov. 25, 2005, at 59, available at 2005 WLNR 19039743 
(referring to the Korean college entrance examination’s ramifications on social status and 
marital and job prospects).  
22. The SAT was introduced into American life on June 23, 1926. See LEMANN, supra 
note 13, at 32. “The Law School Aptitude Test was first offered in February 1948, two months 
into the . . . [Educational Testing Service’s] existence, and a few months later ETS was given 
a contract to develop the Medical Aptitude Test.” Id. at 70. “[T]he University of California 
began requiring all applicants to take the SAT” in 1967. Id. at 171. 
23. Karen W. Arenson & Diana B. Henriques, Company’s Errors on SAT Scores Raise 
New Qualms About Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 
4023422. 
24. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
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reading.”25 Forty-five million such tests will be given this year alone.26 
According to some sources, standardized testing is, today, a “$2 billion 
industry,”27 and “[n]ever has the nation’s education system been so reliant on 
standardized tests and the companies that make them.”28 Students and 
educators focused on access to or performance in higher education are well 
acquainted with the acronyms which denote a barrage of standardized tests, 
including the SAT,29 PSAT/NMSQT,30 ACT,31 GRE,32 GMAT,33 MCAT,34 
DATP,35 LSAT,36 MPRE,37 and MBE.38 “Nearly two million students now 
                                                                                                                             
25. CBS Evening News (television broadcast Apr. 3, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 
5683651.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Winerip, supra note 12. 
29. See CollegeBoard.com, About the Scholastic Aptitude Test, 
http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/about.html (last visited May 25, 2007) 
(“[M]ore than two million students take the SAT every year.”). 
30. See CollegeBoard.com, About PSAT/NMSQT, http://www.collegeboard.com 
/student/testing/psat/about.html (last visited May 25, 2007) (discussing the Preliminary 
Scholastic Aptitude Test and the National Merit Scholarship Qualifying Test). 
31. See ACT.org, The ACT Test, http://www.act.org/aap/ (last visited May 25, 2007) 
(stating that the ACT is “America’s most widely accepted college entrance exam”). 
32. See ETS.org, GRE—Graduate Record Examinations, http://www.ets.org (follow the 
“GRE” hyperlink) (last visited May 25, 2007). 
33. See MBA.com, Are You Ready for the Graduate Management Admission Test 
(GMAT)?, http://www.mba.com/mba/TaketheGMAT (last visited May 25, 2007) (“People 
from all over the world and from all different backgrounds have taken the test . . . .”). 
34. See AAMC.com, The Official Medical College Admission Test (MCAT) Web Site, 
http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/ (last visited May 25, 2007) (“Almost all U.S. medical 
schools require applicants to submit MCAT scores.”). 
35. See ADA.org, Dental Admission Test (DAT), http://www.ada.org/prof/ed/testing 
/dat/index.asp#overview (last visited May 25, 2007) (“Exams are administered year-round . . . 
in the United States, it’s [sic] territories, and Canada.”). 
36. See LSAC.org, About the LSAT, http://www.lsac.org/LSAC.asp?url=lsac/about-the-
lsat.asp (last visited May 25, 2007) (“The Law School Admission Test . . . is a half-day 
standardized test required for admission to all ABA-approved law schools, most Canadian law 
schools, and many non-ABA-approved law schools.”). 
37. See National Conference of Bar Examiners, Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination (MPRE), http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mpre/ (last visited May 25, 
2007) (indicating that the vast majority of American jurisdictions require applicants for 
admission to the bar to pass the MPRE). See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. 
Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 56-58 (2005) (discussing 
the history of the MPRE and opining that “[n]othing was more natural than that calls for 
increased attention to ethics education in law schools, such as Justice Clark’s, would be 
followed by a plan to test whether the changes in legal education were producing measurable 
results”). 
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take ACT’s 8th- and 10th-grade assessment tests, and a growing number of 
states are giving the ACT test to all 11th graders.”39 
The Educational Testing Service annually administers more than twelve 
million tests worldwide.40 But there are other major players. Pearson 
Educational Management, a subsidiary of a “giant” publishing company, 
“scored more than 300 million pages of answers [in 2005] and about 40 
million individual tests.”41 
D.  Spectacular Mis-scoring 
Given the volume of standardized testing, it is not surprising that errors 
occur, either in scoring tests or reporting results (collectively referred to 
hereinafter as “scoring errors” or “mis-scoring”). Yet, when those failings 
are publicized by the media, they are not dismissed as inevitable glitches in 
an otherwise sound system. Rather, because the magnitude of the interests at 
stake, news of scoring errors evokes loud and frequent protests, and calls the 
very enterprise of standardized testing into question.42 Sometimes the 
revelation of mis-scoring precipitates lawsuits, such as recent cases arising 
from mis-scoring of the SAT43 and the teacher test PRAXIS.44 Occasionally, 
there are even legislative investigations.45  
                                                                                                                             
38. See National Conference of Bar Examiners, Jurisdictions Using the MBE in 2007, 
http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe/mbe-faqs/jurs/ (last visited May 25, 2007) 
(indicating that all American states, except Louisiana and Washington, require new lawyers to 
pass the Multistate Bar Examination). 
39. Karen W. Arenson, For SAT Maker, A Broader Push To the Classroom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 14153282.  
40. First Amended Class Action Complaint for Damages at 3, In re Educ. Testing Serv. 
PRAXIS Principles of Learning & Teaching: Grades 7-12 Litig., 429 F. Supp. 2d 752 (E.D. 
La. 2005) (MDL No. 1643), available at 2005 WL 3729540 [hereinafter PRAXIS Complaint] 
(“ETS is the world’s largest private educational testing organization.”). 
41. Arenson & Henriques, supra note 23. 
42. See, e.g., Editorial, SAT Credibility: Scoring Errors on the College Entrance Exam 
Should Result in Better Safeguards and Notification, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Apr. 27, 
2006, at A10, available at 2006 WLNR 7172757 (asserting that mis-scoring affected 
“thousands of students . . . as well as the credibility of the entire SAT program”).  
43. See Karen W. Arenson, Class-Action Lawsuit to be Filed Over SAT Scoring Errors, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 1, at 33, available at 2006 WLNR 5966375 [hereinafter Arenson, 
Class-Action] (discussing a class action against the College Board and one of its contractors, 
quoting a source as remarking that “more than half a dozen . . . law firms were working on 
similar suits,” and noting that an earlier case about the mis-scoring of a state test, which kept 
some students from graduating, was settled for $12 million in 2002). 
44. In re Educ. Testing Serv. PRAXIS Principles of Learning & Teaching: 
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Regardless of the original purposes of standardized testing,46 America 
has in fact built a society that allocates certain valuable goods (e.g., 
diplomas, degrees, scholarships, educational funding, and professional 
opportunities) based to a large extent on standardized test scores. Such 
examinations act as a sorting mechanism that provides information for 
determining how those goods should be distributed. Because the stakes are 
so high, the test scores simply must be accurate. 
Yet in recent years, there have been spectacular instances of standardized 
test scoring errors. One recent failure involved the National Conference of 
Bar Examiners’ (NCBE) distribution of results from the Multistate Bar 
Examination (MBE). The scoring error involved only one of two hundred 
questions on the exam, but affected the scores of “nearly 7,700 of about 
20,000 law school graduates who took the bar exam nationwide.”47 “No 
credit was given for a correct answer on one multiple-choice question 
because of . . . a ‘keying error’ during the scoring process.”48 Based on the 
scores initially reported, some applicants for admission to the practice of law 
were told they had passed the bar examination, and others were told they had 
failed––although in some states applicants had not yet been notified when the 
error became known.49 After some successful test-takers had already been 
sworn in as new lawyers, the NCBE acknowledged that some of the test 
scores were wrong. For days, the magnitude of the problem was unclear, and 
the consequences for the bar applicants were uncertain.50 For example, in 
                                                                                                                             
Grades 7-12 Litig., 429 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (E.D. La. 2005) (discussing monopolization 
claims brought against a testing services provider in the wake of widespread scoring errors); 
see also Karen W. Arenson, Case Involving Errors in Teacher Test is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2006, at A20, available at 2006 WLNR 4293736 [hereinafter Arenson, Errors in 
Teacher Test] (describing an $11.1 million class-action settlement). 
45. See Johnson, supra note 20 (“A New York state senator has subpoenaed executives 
of the College Board over their refusal to release a report on scoring errors in the SAT college 
entrance exam.”). 
46. See LEMANN, supra note 13, at 50 (observing that today the SAT is “almost 
universally taken to be . . . a means of deciding who would reap America’s rich material 
rewards,” although it was originally intended to be a meritocratic device for selecting a “new 
elite . . . governing class”). 
47. Michael Higgins, Mistake Gives 19 Break on Bar Exam; Passing Score is Lowered 
by 1, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 15330655. 
48. Alan Fisk, Error Discovered in February Bar Exam Scoring, MIAMI DAILY BUS. 
REV., May 15, 2006, at 9; see also Jones, supra note 12 (“[A] question that should have 
accepted answers ‘A’ and ‘C’ was keyed to accept answers ‘A’ and ‘D.’”). 
49. See Higgins, supra note 47 (discussing California and New York). 
50. See Error May Change Some Bar Results, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Ohio), May 7, 
2003, at B2, available at 2003 WLNR 2156359 (reporting that although bar passage results 
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Illinois, “[f]or three weeks, a statement on . . . [a] Web site notified 
applicants of the error and said scores were being recalculated but provided 
no further information.”51 Test-takers, who had been told that they had 
passed, worried that they might have failed.52 Others, who had been told they 
had failed, hoped they had passed. Friends and families worried about the 
consequences for loved ones.53 In the end, the magnitude of the bar passage 
problem was relatively small.54 “For the vast majority of test-takers, the error 
made no difference.”55 However, at least one state “uncertified” a new 
lawyer that it had already sworn in.56 It reasoned that regardless of what 
applicants for admission to the bar had been told, if they had not really 
passed the bar examination, they were not qualified to practice law. Other 
states took an opposite course and allowed applicants who had erroneously 
been told that they had passed to keep their licenses.57 In Illinois that meant 
that, because persons with the same score were treated similarly, nineteen 
additional law school graduates, who were originally told they had failed the 
exam, were also allowed to be licensed.58 
                                                                                                                             
had been released, a recalculation was underway that “could change whether a small 
percentage of applicants—5 percent or fewer than 30 people—passed or failed”). 
51. See Higgins, supra note 47. 
52. See T.C. Brown, Newest Attorneys Already Put to Test; Bar Exam Mistake Kept 
Many in Limbo, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), May 9, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WLNR 457608 
(quoting a law graduate as bemoaning that “[t]he last 48 hours have been the most miserable 
of my life”); Kellie A. Wagner, Law Students May Not Be Lawyers After All; Clerical Error 
Forces Re-Grading of All Multistate Tests, CONN. L. TRIB., May 19, 2003, at 6 (discussing the 
uncertain fate of the test-takers); Jones, supra note 12 (quoting one graduate as recounting that 
she remembered where she was when the error was publicized: “It was like the day Kennedy 
was shot”).  
53. See Fisk, supra note 48 (quoting an associate dean at Ohio State University as 
saying that “[s]tudents are scared about taking the bar exam anyway, so it’s terrible to be 
thrown into doubt”).  
54. See, e.g., Error Won’t Affect Bar Exam Passes, BOSTON HERALD, May 17, 2003, at 
14, available at 2003 WLNR 646292 (“[Four hundred] would-be lawyers from Massachusetts 
who were told that their passing grade on the state bar exam was in question because of a 
scoring error were told . . . that their passing grades stand.”); Bar Exam Results Unchanged, 
MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, May 10, 2003, at 10, available at 2003 WLNR 8891213 (discussing 
the effect on Mississippi bar applicants). 
55. See Higgins, supra note 47. 
56. See id. (“[T]he Ohio Supreme Court decided to rescind [one] person’s passing 
score.”). 
57. See id. (discussing three test-takers). 
58. See id. (discussing actions by the state supreme court).  
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More recently, the College Board59 mis-scored “more than 5,000”60 of 
the 495,000 exams61 from the October 2005 Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). 
“The erroneous scoring was uncovered when two alert Minnesota students 
protested their scores and asked that they be recalculated by hand.”62 “The 
score difference for the vast majority of students was less than 100 points 
across all three sections of the test,”63 but some students received scores that 
were “too low . . . by as much as 450 points of a maximum possible 2,400 
points.”64 In addition, about 600 of the students received scores “too high, by 
as much as 50 points.”65 The problem with the test results was discovered by 
the College Board in January 200566 after the College Board asked the 
Pearson Measurement Company, which originally scored the examinations, 
“to hand-score some tests” from the October administration.67 However, the 
error was not made public until March 2006.68 Ultimately, the College Board 
decided that it would report to colleges and universities higher scores for 
students whose exams had been scored too low, but that it would not lower 
the scores of students whose tests had been scored too high.69 This solution 
did not please everyone.70 Students whose initial scores were erroneously 
                                                                                                                             
59. “The College Board is the nonprofit association of colleges and high schools that 
oversees and administers the exam[, the Scholastic Aptitude Test,] that is a key factor in the 
consideration of college admissions officers in determining those who will be admitted to their 
institutions.” Murray Light, SAT Errors Should Not be Tolerated, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 26, 
2006, at H3, available at 2006 WLNR 5152369. 
60. See Karen W. Arenson, College Board Can Do Better, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 2006, at A17, available at 2006 WLNR 12545812 [hereinafter Arenson, Do Better]. 
61. See Press Release, College Board, College Board Announces Changes to a Fraction 
of October SAT Test Scores (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.collegeboard.com 
/press/releases/50519.html (proffering number). 
62. Light, supra note 59. 
63. Press Release, supra note 61. 
64. Arenson, Class-Action, supra note 43. 
65. Id. 
66. CollegeBoard.com, Additional Detail about October 2005 SAT® Scores, 
http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/scores/oct_sat_scores.html (last visited May 
25, 2007) [hereinafter Additional Detail] (acknowledging that “hand score requests were 
received from students in December,” which took three to five weeks to complete). 
67. SAT Scoring Error Prompts a Lawsuit, GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Apr. 9, 2006, 
available at 2006 WLNR 5964533 [hereinafter SAT Scoring Error]. 
68. See Karen W. Arenson, Technical Problems Cause Errors in SAT Test Scores, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A18, available at 2006 WLNR 3870065 [hereinafter Arenson, 
Technical Problems] (providing chronology). 
69. Id. 
70. Cf. Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 987 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(rejecting the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction that “the reported [SAT] scores of 613 
students be reduced and re-reported”). 
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low feared that, during the interim, they had been denied admissions 
opportunities and scholarships to which they were rightfully entitled. 
Students whose exams had been scored accurately worried that they had been 
disadvantaged by being forced to compete with some applicants whose 
scores were erroneously too high and never corrected.71 Colleges and 
universities were forced to address a myriad of inquiries and, in many 
instances, to review applicant files yet another time72 as the truth played out 
in the critical winter-spring time period of the admission season.73 Because 
many offers of admission or scholarship assistance had been made and 
accepted between December and March,74 it is likely that the erroneous 
information had an impact on some of those decisions. A class action arising 
from the errors in scoring the SAT is now pending.75  
                                                                                                                             
71. See Karen W. Arenson, Class-Action Forms Over SAT Blunder, HOUSTON CHRON., 
Apr. 9, 2006, at A6, available at 2006 WLNR 5989629 [hereinafter Arenson, SAT Blunder] 
(quoting a lawyer with a firm that filed a class action as stating, “It is unfair that regular 
students have to compete against those students with inflated scores for admission, 
scholarships and financial aid” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
72. See Karen W. Arenson, Officials Say Scoring Errors for SAT Were Understated, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A18, available at 2006 WLNR 3936243 [hereinafter Arenson, 
Scoring Errors] (quoting the dean of admissions at the University of Pennsylvania as 
lamenting, when the SAT scoring errors were disclosed, “We’ve been through half the 
admitted class already, and now we have to stop everything and review those students who 
were affected” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
73. See Arenson, Technical Problems, supra note 68 (stating that college admissions 
officials said that errors in scoring the SAT “would force them to review the admissions and 
financial aid decisions for all of the affected students”); Johnson, supra note 20 (“The scoring 
problem forced many colleges to reopen admissions files just as they were trying to make final 
decisions.”). 
74. See Arenson, Technical Problems, supra note 68 (“The disclosure came at the 
height of the college admissions season, at a time when many colleges have already made 
many of their decisions about which students to accept, reject or defer.”). 
75. See Russo, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 986 (holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a 
preliminary injunction on their breach of contract claim against the College Board and a 
national testing service (collectively “defendants”)). The Russo court further stated that 
dismissal of negligence claims against the defendants was premature, but the court did dismiss 
plaintiffs’ strict liability claims. Id. at 996. The College Board did not defame the plaintiffs, 
though the plaintiffs stated a defamation claim against the testing service. Id. at 1001-02. 
Additionally, defendants did not violate implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose, or an express warranty, or the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, or the New 
York Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 997-99. For purposes of breach of a contract claim 
against the testing service, the plaintiffs could not be considered third-party beneficiaries of a 
services agreement between the testing service and the College Entrance Examination Board. 
Id. at 1000. Finally, the court held that false advertising and consumer fraud claims against the 
testing service under Minnesota statutes were not pled with sufficient particularity. Id. at 
1003. 
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In yet another recent case, the Educational Testing Service 
acknowledged that it had graded some essay answers on PRAXIS, a teacher 
test, “too stringently.”76 “About 27,000 people who took the exam received 
lower scores than they should have, and 4,100 of them were wrongly told 
they had failed.”77 The resulting class action was eventually settled by 
creation of an $11.1 million fund to provide cash payments to plaintiffs for 
“lost wages, decreased earning capacity, and other damages.”78 
There are other reports of standardized test scoring errors. Such 
problems have occurred in “state after state,”79 including mis-scoring in 
California, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Washington,80 
as well as lost answer sheets in Florida.81 The Minnesota problems resulted 
in the settlement of “a multimillion-dollar lawsuit regarding scoring errors . . 
. that affected more than 8,000 students.”82 
A CBS report suggested that the mis-scoring of the October 2005 SAT 
was part of “a much bigger problem . . . with scoring accuracy [that goes] 
right down to the grade school level.”83 The report quoted “[t]he principal 
author for more than two decades of the highly regarded Iowa basic skills 
                                                                                                                             
76. See Arenson, Errors in Teacher Test, supra note 44. 
77. See id. But see In re Educ. Testing Serv. PRAXIS Principles of Learning & 
Teaching: Grades 7-12 Litig., 429 F. Supp. 2d 752, 754 (E.D. La. 2005) (disclosing that “test 
scores . . . were too low for about 40,000 test takers”). 
78. See Arenson, Errors in Teacher Test, supra note 44 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
79. CBS Evening News, supra note 25 (“[I]n the years since No Child Left Behind took 
effect, scoring blunders have been discovered in state after state.”). 
80. See Arenson & Henriques, supra note 23 (discussing the Minnesota litigation and 
referring to “significant” scoring errors in Virginia and Washington); Silverstein, supra note 7 
(indicating that in California, “a company now known as Harcourt Assessment Inc. 
miscalculated the results of 19,000 students and 22 schools on a Stanford 9 achievement test” 
in 2000); see also Jerry Gray, 13 Told They Didn’t Pass Bar Exam After All, N.Y. TIMES, May 
19, 1999, at B5, available at 1999 WLNR 3022406 (describing a “mix-up [that] occurred 
when scores from essay questions on property law in the national section of the examination 
were mistakenly applied to questions on New Jersey’s property law when the results were 
being typed into a computer”); Press Release, N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners (Nov. 30, 
2001), available at http://www.nybarexam.org/jul2001.htm (announcing that on the July 2001 
New York State Bar Examination, “due to a computer program error, the results of the two 
readings of the written portion of the examinations of applicants who fell within the reread 
range . . . were not averaged” and therefore the Board, “for this examination only, . . . will 
pass all applicants who achieved a passing score on either the initial grading or the regrading, 
thus demonstrating minimum competence on one reading of the examination”). 
81. High Stakes, supra note 1 (discussing Florida, Minnesota, Virginia, and 
Washington).  
82. Editorial, supra note 42. 
83. CBS Evening News, supra note 25. 
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test” as describing the state of standardized testing in this country as 
“overburdened.”84 According to one count, there were at least “137 publicly 
disclosed cases of large-scale testing errors by educational testing companies 
from 1976 through early 2004, with most of them occurring since 1997.”85 
E.  Litigation Follows Innovation 
It is not surprising, or necessarily undesirable, that erroneous 
standardized test scores are beginning to generate tort litigation. This is the 
natural course of development in America. Innovation is frequently followed 
by litigation because new or expanded practices often cause harm. When 
losses occur as a result of such developments, lawsuits offer a public 
mechanism for compensating injured persons,86 forcing innovators to 
internalize the costs of their endeavors,87 and creating incentives for 
measures that minimize future harm by reducing activity levels88 or 
increasing precautions.89 Within proper limits, litigation can, and frequently 
                                                                                                                             
84. Id. 
85. Silverstein, supra note 7; see also James P. Durling, Testing the Tests: The Due 
Process Implications of Minimum Competency Testing, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 577, 616 (1984) 
(“[A] high school administering a minimum competency test in Tattnall County, Georgia, 
reported scoring errors on over half of the examinations.”). 
86. Cf. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 9 (3d ed. 
2005) (noting that it frequently has been argued that “[t]here is a strong public interest in 
insuring that accident victims obtain the financial resources needed to overcome the injuries 
they have sustained”).  
87. See Vincent R. Johnson, Economic Analysis of Injury to Persons, Property, and 
Relations, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY (David S. Clark ed., forthcoming 2007) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Economic Analysis] (“Tort rules may be used to . . . create a legal 
incentive for the actor to determine whether the activity is worthwhile––whether the costs 
outweigh the benefits. . . . Forcing actors to internalize the costs of their endeavors helps to 
promote responsible decision making about what types of activities and safety precautions 
should be undertaken.”).  
88. See Turner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 476 So. 2d 800, 807 (La. 1985) (Dennis, 
J., assigning additional reasons) (“Accident law generally should pursue four primary goals: 
(1) reduction of the total cost of accidents by deterrence of activity causing accidents; (2) 
reduction of societal cost of accidents by spreading the loss among large numbers; (3) 
reducing the cost of administering the accident system; and (4) doing all of these by methods 
consistent with our sense of justice.”) (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24-33 (1970)); see also Johnson, Economic Analysis, supra 
note 87 (opining that if it is “costly for a person to engage in an activity because liability will 
be assessed for resulting losses . . . some persons who might otherwise participate in the 
activity may elect not to do so”).  
89. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 7 (“The deterrence principle recognizes that 
tort law is concerned not only with fairly allocating past losses, but also with minimizing the 
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does, provide a healthy check on market excesses by forcing persons who 
benefit from selling goods or services to bear the burden of incidental 
losses90 or at least to spread those losses broadly among those who enjoy the 
goods or services.91 
In the early and mid-twentieth century, mass production of automobiles 
was soon followed by car-accident lawsuits,92 and mass-marketing of 
                                                                                                                             
costs of future accidents. According to this principle, tort rules should discourage persons 
from engaging in those forms of conduct which pose an excessive risk of personal injury or 
property damage.”). 
90. See id. at 8 (arguing that American tort law has been shaped in part by the idea that 
those who enjoy the benefit from injury-producing activities, rather than innocent third 
persons, should bear the losses resulting from those activities).  
91. Loss-spreading is a concept that runs throughout tort law, influencing causes of 
action, such as those which create products liability. See, e.g., Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 
36 F.3d 278, 285 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that court recognized strict liability for 
manufacturing defects because “[m]anufacturers were deemed to be in the best position to 
provide ‘insurance’ against accidents by spreading the cost of accidents among all consumers 
of the product”); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) 
(discussing risk-spreading in products liability). Loss-spreading also influences general tort 
principles, such as respondeat superior. See, e.g., Nelson ex rel. Hirschfeld v. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 935 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 
1997) (“[A]n employer’s liability under respondeat superior ‘arises not as a result of any 
actual negligence by the employer,’ but because the employer reaps the benefits of the 
employee’s acts and may more easily spread the cost of accidents.” (quoting Krukiewicz v. 
Draper, 725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986))). “The idea underlying the ‘spreading’ rationale is 
that the financial burden of accidents may be diminished by spreading losses broadly so that 
no person is forced to bear a large share of the damages.” JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 
7. “Risk-spreading is often desirable—that is why people buy insurance.” Id. at 703. However, 
the concept has limits.  
[T]he most expansive possible system of tort liability could not make the private 
purchase of insurance (or a public equivalent, such as Social Security disability 
insurance) unnecessary—most people die from causes like sickness, old age, or 
accidents that are entirely their own fault, causes for which no potential defendant 
could be found. 
Id.; see also Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1135 (3d Cir. 1993) (Becker, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that the government contractor defense 
“thwart[s] both the policy of compensating injured persons and the policy of risk-spreading”). 
92. “[I]n 1905 all of American automobile case law could be contained within a four-
page law review article, but three decades later, a ‘comprehensive, detailed treatment [of 
automobile law] would call for an encyclopedia.’” Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, 
Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 77 (2003) 
(quoting Richard M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476, 476 (1936)). 
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consumer goods gave rise to products-liability litigation.93 More recently, the 
widespread use of computerized databases has produced lawsuits related to 
data security and identity theft,94 and the expansion of international 
education programs is now generating claims by students injured while 
studying in foreign countries.95 It is entirely natural, from the perspective of 
more than a century of American legal history, for the recent vast expansion 
of standardized testing96 to be followed by lawsuits seeking to balance the 
sometimes conflicting97 goals of compensating victims98 and deterring bad 
practices,99 with the need to craft liability rules that facilitate the types of 
innovative practices and products that promote growth and progress100 and 
assist societal achievement and personal fulfillment.  
                                                                                                                             
93. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 741, 744 (2003) (“[I]t was the dramatic development of the mass-marketing of 
consumer goods in the twentieth century that spawned modern products liability law.”). 
94. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort 
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 261 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, Cybersecurity] (discussing 
database security cases). 
95. Vincent R. Johnson, Americans Abroad: International Educational Programs and 
Tort Liability, 32 J.C. & U.L. 309, 359 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Americans Abroad] 
(“Like many laudable activities that were once conducted with little thought of civil liability, 
international education programs must now be operated with due regard for the legal 
principles that impose a general duty of reasonable care, that punish misrepresentation, and 
that award compensation for injuries attributable to blameworthy conduct. This is a good 
development, for it discourages irresponsible practices and creates incentives for safety.”).  
96. See supra notes 20-41 and accompanying text. 
97. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 9 (discussing the “sometimes antagonistic” 
policies underlying modern tort law); cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. 
L. REV. 481, 499 (2005) (analogizing the “competing and sometimes complementary policies 
of modern tort law . . . [to] orreries––the clockwork, astronomical apparatuses of eighteenth 
century natural philosophers”). 
98. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 9 (“There is a strong public interest in 
insuring that accident victims obtain the financial resources needed to overcome the injuries 
they have sustained.”). 
99. See Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect 
Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 319-25 & n.33 (2006) (discussing deterrence and the 
policy of preventing future harm). 
100.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 8 (“[T]here is continuing concern that 
tort liability not be so readily imposed that industrial creativity is stifled, that entrepreneurship 
is chilled, that professionals are unwilling to render important services, or that American 
businesses become globally uncompetitive.”). 
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Tort litigation, like litigation generally, often serves useful purposes.101 
To begin with, it forces companies and other enterprises to examine harmful 
practices that might otherwise receive inadequate attention. For example, the 
College Board’s president dismissively said that it “did not really matter” 
why SAT exams became wet before they were mis-scored.102 But preventing 
losses in the future often depends on determining precisely why a certain 
type of problem occurred in the first instance.  
Tort litigation also plays a vital role in addressing problems that are left 
unresolved by legislatures, too often factionalized or subject to pernicious 
lobbying practices,103 and administrative agencies, too frequently 
underfunded, politically manipulated, or “captive” to the interests they are 
supposed to regulate.104 Indeed, without a fair forum in which to litigate 
disputes about conduct that causes harm, or other governmental avenues for 
redress, victims of intentional or accidental injuries might resort to violence 
and other undesirable practices, as they sometimes do in other countries. For 
example, in China, students who had been defrauded by a university recently 
                                                                                                                             
101.  Cf. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985) (“[W]e 
cannot endorse the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is an evil. Over the course of centuries, 
our society has settled upon civil litigation as a means for redressing grievances, resolving 
disputes, and vindicating rights when other means fail. There is no cause for consternation 
when a person who believes in good faith and on the basis of accurate information regarding 
his legal rights that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury turns to the courts for a 
remedy.”). 
102.  Karen W. Arenson, What Organizations Don’t Want to Know Can Hurt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 14497398 [hereinafter Arenson, Don’t 
Want to Know] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103.  See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public 
Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12-13 (2006) (discussing pernicious lobbying 
practices). 
104.  See Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the 
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1026, 1048-53 (1989) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Liberating Progress] (discussing how administrative agencies are subject to budgetary 
limitations, political manipulation, and pressure from special interests). “Administrative 
capture” occurs when an administrative agency is dominated by those it is supposed to 
regulate and thereby made less effective. See Ian Ayres & F. Clayton Miller, “I’ll Sell It to 
You at Cost”: Legal Methods to Promote Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 
1070 n.87 (1990) (“Captured agencies have been the source of many inefficient regulations.”); 
see also Christopher Wyeth Kirkham, Note, Busting the Administrative Trust: An 
Experimentalist Approach to Universal Service Administration in Telecommunications Policy, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 623 (1998) (“Administrative capture by special interests leads to 
policy approaches that often fail to account for the interests of the less influential public.”).  
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rioted105 because China presently has no tort system or other mechanism 
offering a realistic opportunity for resolving such disputes.106 
The American tort system is not perfect—but neither is any other legal 
system. “[O]ne should not lose sight of the fact that in America at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century life is relatively safe from risks of 
accidental harm, and that the victims of the accidents that do occur have a 
reasonably fair chance of obtaining redress.”107 This is due in large part to 
the relief afforded by common-law and statutory tort principles. 
Standardized test mis-scoring lawsuits can provide redress to injured 
parties in circumstances where justice demands such relief. In one recent 
                                                                                                                             
105.  Joseph Kahn, Rioting in China Over Label on College Diplomas, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 10749995 (discussing demonstrations on 
campus at Shengda College in central China). The students, if their story is true, had been 
defrauded. They had been told that their diplomas would bear the name of a prestigious 
university. Id. The promise seemed plausible because Chinese schools were being 
reorganized. Id. Relying upon the representation, the students paid top-dollar tuition. Id. When 
graduation came, the students’ diplomas bore the name of a different, less prestigious school. 
Id. As professional credentials, the degrees were not worth what the students had paid. Id.  
In simple terms, the students allegedly had been lied to and cheated. If these events had 
occurred in the United States, there would not have been riots. The students would have hired 
a lawyer on a contingent-fee basis and sued the university for fraud. If their claim had merit, 
they would have recovered damages. If it didn’t, the suit would have been dismissed. See also 
Clifford Coonan, Students Riot Over Fake Diploma Claim, IRISH TIMES (Ir.), Oct. 26, 2006, at 
13, available at 2006 WLNR 18540433 (reporting that students at a university in eastern 
China rioted and “ransacked” the campus because college authorities, among other things, 
were “issuing fake diplomas”). 
106.  The absence of a viable tort system in China is the legacy of old-style 
communism. When China was really communist (from 1949 to roughly 1980), there was no 
need for tort law. The work unit provided everything: a job, an education, medical care, a 
place to live, retirement. Everyone was equally poor. No one had anything to lose either as a 
result of a tort or as the result of a tort lawsuit. See Vincent R. Johnson & Brian T. Bagley, 
Fighting Epidemics with Information and Laws: The Case of SARS in China, 24 PENN ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 157, 173 (2005) (explaining why, in China, “there was traditionally little need 
for a tort system”) (reviewing CHENGLIN LIU, CHINESE LAW ON SARS (2004)). China is now 
experiencing vast changes. See Vincent R. Johnson, Chinese Law on SARS by Chenglin Liu, 7 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 32, 33 (2006) (discussing the pace of physical changes to the 
physical and legal environment in China) (reviewing LIU, supra). New-style Chinese 
communism is essentially capitalism with amounts calculated in yuan, the Chinese currency. 
While there is still much poverty in China, there is plenty of new wealth, too. Many Chinese 
now have something to lose, like the students who paid tuition five times the going rate 
because they were promised a prestigious degree. The Chinese students had no real 
opportunity to take their dispute to court. Not only is there no tort law in China, but 
contingent-fee representation is uncommon. 
107.  Vincent R. Johnson, Tort Law in America at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 1 
RENMIN U. L. REV. (China) 237, 264 (2000). 
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case, a test-taker who had erroneously been told that he had failed an exam 
used to determine eligibility for teacher licensing in many states, had 
difficulty finding a job because the failure “was a real albatross hanging 
around [his] neck.”108 However, after the error was corrected “he quickly 
landed” a high school teaching position.109 Not surprisingly, he “applauded” 
the class-action settlement in the standardized test mis-scoring lawsuit in 
which he was a named plaintiff.110 
F.  Viability of Tort Remedies 
This Article explores whether American tort law offers viable remedies 
for persons harmed by erroneous scoring of standardized tests. The focus 
here is narrow. The Article does not address the merits of standardized 
testing, the coherence and reliability of test questions, or even the correctness 
of “correct” answers.111 Rather, the discussion focuses on two things: first, 
cases involving questions that were scored inconsistently or according to the 
wrong scale; and second, cases where correct and incorrect answers were 
totaled inaccurately or were otherwise reported erroneously to those who 
received the results. 
Part II begins by briefly discussing several important preliminary 
matters. Part II.A considers the many types of damages which may be at 
issue in standardized test score tort litigation for the purpose of clarifying 
just what is at stake. Part II.B addresses the “truth-in-testing” laws that have 
been passed in some jurisdictions, and concludes that they offer no real 
recourse for test-takers and institutions harmed by erroneous standardized 
test scores. Part II.C argues that while contract remedies are sometimes (but 
not always) available to incorrect-test-score victims, such relief should not 
bar redress under tort theories. Part II.D considers the economic-loss rule in 
tort law, which generally holds that negligence is not actionable if it causes 
only economic harm, unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage. 
The discussion concludes that the economic-loss rule is only a partial 
                                                                                                                             
108.  Arenson, Errors in Teacher Test, supra note 44 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
109.  Id.  
110.  Id.  
111.  Cf. Lewin v. Med. Coll. of Hampton Rds., 931 F. Supp. 443, 445-46 (E.D. Va. 
1996) (holding that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act did not permit a former 
medical student to challenge the correctness of answers on a pharmacology exam), aff’d, 120 
F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Delgado, supra note 12, at 598 (“[O]n one administration of 
the SAT, four out of forty five verbal test answers turned out to be wrong, and many other 
wrong answers were as plausibly correct as the ones ETS keyed correct.”). 
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obstacle to suits based on erroneous standardized test scoring because many 
potential causes of action are not based on mere negligence, and other causes 
of action (such as negligent misrepresentation) fall within exceptions to the 
rule.  
Part III next examines an array of tort claims that might arise from 
erroneous scoring of standardized tests, including negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (Part III.A), misrepresentation (Part III.B), defamation and 
false-light invasion of privacy (Part III.C), tortious interference with 
prospective advantage (Part III.D), and injurious falsehood (Part III.E). The 
analysis finds that while some of these theories will rarely offer a viable 
avenue for recovery, other theories, on particular facts, may provide a basis 
for relief.  
Part IV concludes by arguing that although courts should be cautious in 
entertaining tort claims based on erroneous scoring of standardized tests, the 
courthouse doors should not be closed. Suits relating to erroneous scoring of 
standardized tests will sometimes have merit. Tort law offers a useful 
mechanism for compensating the harm caused by certain types of erroneous-
scoring claims. It can also create incentives for good practices in 
standardized testing. 
II.  PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.  Damages in Erroneous Scoring Cases 
Standardized test scoring errors cause many types of losses, not all of 
which will be equally compensable under tort law. The key variables in 
determining whether a particular element of damages will be awarded are the 
strength of the causal link between the mis-scoring and the alleged harm, and 
whether the amount of the loss can be quantified with reasonable certainty. If 
there is serious doubt as to either causation or amount, recovery of an 
element of damages may be denied. 
The fact and magnitude of some mis-scoring losses can be established 
with a high degree of certainty if the losses are the direct result of 
foreseeable out-of-pocket expenditures. For example, a test-taker who 
receives an erroneously low score may quite predictably spend readily 
ascertainable amounts of money on: securing a re-scoring of the initial 
exam;112 registering to take the test again;113 enrolling in a test preparation 
                                                                                                                             
112.  PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 8 (seeking compensation for test re-
scoring).  
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course;114 purchasing study aids;115 securing professional tutoring or 
diagnostic assistance;116 traveling to the repeat test site;117 or perhaps even 
enrolling in test-related academic offerings.118 
Certain other types of losses, involving reduced income rather than 
expenditures, may be so likely to result from an erroneously low score that 
their legitimacy cannot readily be doubted. The only uncertainty in such 
cases will reside in fixing the amount, but even then the jury may find 
guidance in what many would regard as reliable evidence, such as average 
earnings figures for new employees in a particular field. Reduced income for 
a test-taker who is the victim of erroneous scoring may result in a variety of 
ways, including: time away from work to sit for the repeat test or to take 
related courses;119 denial of necessary professional certification or 
licensing;120 and otherwise delayed entry into the job market.121 
Reduced income resulting from lost scholarships will often be easy to 
quantify. Several states employ merit scholarship programs that “use[] 
                                                                                                                             
113.  See id. (seeking compensation for costs related to “taking the tests on multiple 
occasions” and “paying late registration fees”). 
114.  Cf. Karen W. Arenson, 1,600 SAT Tests Escaped Check for Scoring Errors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A21, available at 2006 WLNR 4230255 [hereinafter Arenson, Tests 
Escaped Check] (indicating that some families pay “thousands of dollars to raise their 
children’s scores by 50 or 100 points”). 
115.  See PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 9 (seeking compensation for 
“purchasing study guides to assist in future tests”). 
116.  See id. (seeking compensation for “diagnostic evaluations to understand why 
[test-takers] failed”). 
117.  See id. (seeking compensation for “travel related expenses to take the tests out of 
town”). 
118.  Id. at 8 (alleging that mis-scoring of a teacher test caused “additional tuition 
expenses”); id. at 9 (seeking compensation for “performing additional course work”). 
119.  See id. at 9 (seeking compensation for wages lost as a resulting from time away 
from work). 
120.  Id. at 8 (alleging that mis-scoring of a teacher-test “prevented some Plaintiffs and 
Class members from receiving or timely receiving their professional credentials, and thus, 
have prevented them from retaining or obtaining employment as certified teachers [and] . . . 
caused . . . a loss of income, benefits, seniority, [and] tenure”). 
121.  Id. (alleging that mis-scoring of a teacher test “delayed the graduation from 
Bachelor’s or Master’s degree programs for some Plaintiffs and Class members, and . . . . [a]s 
a result, some Plaintiffs and Class members . . . lost wages and job benefits as a result of their 
delay in entering the job market”); see also id. at 9-10 (alleging that “some Plaintiffs and 
Class members who were given a passing, yet incorrect score” were potentially “barred from 
certification as a teacher in a state” to which they wish to move that required a higher passing 
score, with the necessity of having “to re-take the PRAXIS test and pay all associated fees”). 
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specific SAT scores to determine awards.”122 Also, at many colleges and 
universities, scholarships are awarded based simply on a matrix formula, 
where the variables are grade point average (GPA) and test score.123 At a 
particular school, an admitted law student with an LSAT score of 160 and an 
undergraduate GPA of 3.5, might be routinely awarded a $10,000 
scholarship, since that is the amount awarded to every student in the matrix 
category. However, a student with the same undergraduate GPA and a test 
score of 155 might be normally awarded $5,000, according to the matrix. If a 
law student who is the victim of erroneous standardized test scoring can 
point to such evidence, it may be possible for the student to quantify the 
student’s economic loss with sufficient persuasiveness to permit recovery of 
that element of damages.124 Of course, if a college or university is the 
plaintiff, it should be able to use similar evidence to show that, but for the 
test score error, it would have offered a student a lower scholarship.  
There may be other cases of compelling evidence that the plaintiff 
suffered economic harm. A student might be able to show, for example, that 
but for a test score error, the student would have fallen into the “presumptive 
admit” category at the state university, and that by enrolling there the student 
would have saved a certain amount of money each year by qualifying for in-
state tuition. If the student in fact applied to the state university, this type of 
argument may be quite reasonable and sufficient to support a jury award. 
Some of the losses that undoubtedly result from standardized test scoring 
errors may be so difficult to quantify that the law will be reluctant to permit 
recovery. Into this category may fall compensation for the value of: missing 
a graduation ceremony;125 suffering embarrassment and other forms of 
emotional distress;126 and (depending on the precise facts) losing the 
opportunity to attend an educational program to which the test-taker either 
                                                                                                                             
122.  Karen W. Arenson, Colleges Say SAT Mistakes May Affect Scholarships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, § 1, at 118, available at 2006 WLNR 4986540 (stating that a recent 
survey found that seven out of fourteen states followed the practice). 
123.  Id. (describing a similar state program in New Jersey). 
124.  Id. (indicating that an erroneous SAT score––later corrected––would have 
dropped one student at a Pennsylvania college from a $12,500 scholarship to a $5,000 one). 
125.  Editorial, supra note 42 (discussing harm caused by mis-scoring of a Minnesota 
state test, which resulted in a multi-million dollar settlement). 
126.  See PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 10 (alleging that test-takers who 
received erroneous scores suffered “devastating effects on their careers [and] experienced 
personal injuries, including serious and severe emotional distress . . . and have sought medical 
and psychological assistance”). 
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applied and was rejected127 or decided not to apply because the erroneous 
score appeared not to be competitive.128 
Finally, some asserted losses may be so dubiously linked to standardized 
test scoring errors that it will be difficult or impossible for a court to find, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that but for the mis-scoring, the loss would 
not have occurred. This may be true, for example, where a test-taker argues 
that because of an erroneous score a job offer was not extended.129 Similarly, 
a student who contends that, but for a defendant’s misrepresentation, the 
student would have been admitted to a better school, gotten a better job, and 
made higher lifetime earnings will be hard pressed to establish the requisite 
level of certainty to sustain an award of those damages.130  
B.  Truth-in-Testing Laws 
In response to complaints about the “arbitrariness and exaggerated 
importance”131 of standardized test scores and the impact of professional 
coaching on test-taker performance,132 California133 and New York134 passed 
truth-in-testing laws in 1978 and 1979, respectively. Today, such legislation 
also exists in other states.135 The chief impact of truth-in-testing laws is to 
require certain (typically large) test agencies to: (1) disclose, with respect to 
                                                                                                                             
127.  Cf. Arenson, Scoring Errors, supra note 72 (discussing rejection of early 
admissions applications). 
128.  See Arenson, Tests Escaped Check, supra note 114 (describing one student who 
“slashed Harvard and Yale off her list of college applications” after her SAT total “plunged 
180 points, to 1,890 out of a possible 2,400” as a result of a scoring error); see also Arenson, 
Scoring Errors, supra note 72 (indicating that when SAT scoring errors were announced 
months after scores had been distributed to students and colleges, “[a] vice president and dean 
of admissions at Pomona College in California . . . questioned how many students had altered 
the lists of colleges they were applying to because their scores had been reported as lower than 
they really were”). 
129.  Cf. PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 9 (alleging that mis-scoring may have 
caused employers to use erroneous scores “to differentiate between or rank job applicants”). 
130.  But see DeJesus v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 02-0253, 2005 WL 
2175174, at *3-6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2005) (taking standardized test scores into account in 
wrongful death calculations). 
131.  LEMANN, supra note 13, at 224. 
132.  Id. at 223. 
133.  CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99150-99164 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
134.  N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 340-348 (McKinney 2000); see also LEMANN, supra note 13, 
at 225-26 (discussing the chaotic path to adoption in New York). 
135.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-747(B) (Supp. 2006) (requiring the state 
board of education to adopt procedures “to allow parents of pupils and the general public to 
view the nationally standardized norm-referenced achievement test” required by state law). 
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certain exams,136 statistical research137 and previously used test questions;138 
(2) make individual performance data available to test subjects;139 and (3) 
collect demographic performance information relating to such groups as 
women and minorities.140 
Following passage of the New York legislation, the Educational Testing 
Service (ETS) “decided to treat the New York truth-in-testing law as if it 
were federal legislation, since it would be too difficult to make up one set of 
tests for New Yorkers that would be made public later and another set for 
everyone else that wouldn’t.”141 The New York law contains no provisions 
offering compensation to victims of standardized test scoring errors. Rather, 
the law merely provides that a violation of its various regulatory provisions 
may result in “a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars for each 
violation.”142 Thus, the New York law, like its counterparts in other states, 
does not obviate the need for tort law remedies. 
C.  Contract Law 
If a test-taker whose score is reported incorrectly paid a fee to take the 
test, the mis-scoring could be treated as a breach of an express or implied 
contractual promise to correctly grade the exam, and the test-taker could then 
                                                                                                                             
136.  See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 342(5)-(5)(b) (McKinney 2000) (stating exceptions 
relating to GRE Advanced Tests, MCAT, and SAT II).  
137.  See id. § 341 (requiring disclosure by a test agency of “any unpublished study, 
evaluation or statistical report cited in memoranda of support or opposition to legislation or 
proposed rules and regulations relating to standardized testing written or published by the test 
agency”). 
138.  See id. § 342(1) (“Within thirty days after the results of any standardized test are 
released, the test agency shall file or cause to be filed with the commissioner: (a) a copy of all 
test questions used in calculating the test subject’s raw score; (b) the corresponding acceptable 
answers to those questions; and (c) all rules for converting raw scores into those scores 
reported to the test subject together with an explanation of such rules.”). 
139.  See id. § 342(2) (mandating that each test agency, for a nominal fee, “provide to 
the test subject the opportunity to secure: (a) a copy of the test questions used to calculate the 
test subject’s raw score; (b) a copy of the test subject’s answer sheet, or answer record where 
there is no answer sheet, together with a copy of the correct answer sheet to the same test with 
questions used to calculate the test subject’s raw score so marked; and (c) a statement of the 
raw score used to calculate the scores reported to the test subject”). 
140.  See id. § 341-a(2) (requiring collection of data relating to race or ethnicity, 
gender, and household language); id. § 341-a(4)(b) (requiring reporting “by race or ethnicity, 
linguistic background and gender [of] the mean-scaled scores of test subjects, the standard 
deviation of scaled scores, and the distribution of scaled scores”). 
141.  LEMANN, supra note 13, at 227. 
142.  N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 347 (McKinney 2000). 
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sue for contract damages.143 However, in many instances, the test-taker does 
not pay a fee, as when students in a public school system are required to pass 
a state-mandated achievement test. In that case, no breach-of-contract claim 
is feasible. Similarly, test-score recipients, such as colleges and universities, 
typically have no contract with testing agencies. Except perhaps on a third-
party-beneficiary theory,144 contract law offers those institutions no relief for 
losses they sustain as a result of incorrect scores. 
Even if a contract claim is available to persons harmed by erroneous 
standardized test results, that does not foreclose a tort-law analysis (except, 
possibly, under the economic-loss rule, discussed below).145 In many areas of 
the law, such as products liability, a plaintiff has the option of asserting a 
breach-of-contract claim, or tort claims based on negligence or strict liability, 
or all of those theories.146 Similarly, a client harmed by the conduct of a 
lawyer ordinarily may sue for breach of contract, as well as for the torts of 
negligence, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty.147 The categorization of the 
claim will have many important consequences. It will determine, for 
example, the applicable statute of limitations, pertinent defenses, 
dischargeability of a judgment in bankruptcy, insurance coverage, and the 
appropriate standards for calculating damages.148 However, American law 
has often recognized that relief afforded by contract law (expectation,149 or 
                                                                                                                             
143.  Cf. Murray v. Educ. Testing Serv., 170 F.3d 514, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a standardized test administrator did not breach its contract with a student who took a test 
by refusing to release suspicious test scores because the contract clearly and explicitly 
reserved the right to withhold suspect scores, and the administrator fulfilled its sole 
contractual duty by conducting a good faith investigation). 
144.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) (discussing 
intended and incidental beneficiaries). But see Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 
981, 1000 (D. Minn. 2006) (“Because the Services Agreement [between the College Board 
and the entity that mis-scored SAT examinations] explicitly provides that ‘[n]o provision of 
this Agreement shall in any way inure to the benefit of any third person,’ Plaintiffs cannot be 
considered third party beneficiaries of the Services Agreement.” (second alteration in 
original)). 
145.  See infra Part II.D. 
146.  See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 678 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 
5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON] (discussing theories of recovery for harm 
caused by product defects). 
147.  See Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 737, 742-51 (2003) (discussing theories of attorney liability, including breach of 
fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, and breach of contract). 
148.  Cf. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 26-30 (discussing the consequences of 
classifying a tort action as intentional, negligent, or strict liability). 
149.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (discussing expectation 
damages). 
  
 
 
 
 
680  RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:655 
 
 
reliance,150 damages) is sometimes inadequate in comparison to tort 
principles,151 and there is certainly no general rule that, merely because a 
contract claim can be stated, tort law remedies are unavailable. Thus, it is not 
surprising that in the PRAXIS teacher-test mis-scoring litigation,152 the 
plaintiffs alleged multiple claims for breach of contract, negligence, and 
negligent misrepresentation.153 
D.  The Economic-Loss Rule in Tort Law 
In some respects, providing remedies for economic losses (as opposed to 
personal injuries and property damages) is more properly the concern of 
contract law than tort law. Reflecting this view, courts often hold (at least in 
the products-liability context) that negligence which causes economic losses 
unaccompanied by personal injuries or property damages is not actionable 
under tort principles.154 These rulings are sometimes summed up as the 
“economic-loss rule.”155 However, the full contours of the “rule” are far from 
clear,156 and there exist so many exceptions and limitations157 that some 
scholars doubt whether there is a “rule” at all. 
                                                                                                                             
150.  See id. § 349 (discussing reliance damages). 
151.  When the College Board mis-graded nearly five thousand SAT tests and revised 
upward the scores of students whose exams it had graded too low, it said that it “regret[ted] 
any further worry or inconvenience that this problem may have caused students and families” 
and that it was “refunding those students’ test registration fees as well as any other fees 
associated with sending scores” to educational institutions. Press Release, supra note 61. 
152.  See supra note 44. 
153.  PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 10-16. 
154.  See, e.g., E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
866 (1986) (discussing the risk that “contract law would drown in a sea of tort”). 
155.  See AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC 
LOSS § 8 (2005) (preliminary draft no. 1) (discussing the economic-loss rule). See generally 
Johnson, Cybersecurity, supra note 94, at 296-303 (discussing the economic-loss rule). 
Minnesota cases sometimes arrive at the same conclusion under that state’s “independent duty 
rule,” which provides that when a contract defines a relationship between two parties, a 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover tort damages save for exceptional cases in which a breach of 
contract “‘constitutes or is accompanied by an independent tort.’” Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 
462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 994 (D. Minn. 2006) (quoting Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 789-90 
(Minn. 1975)). Minnesota law “recognizes an exception for providers of professional services 
. . . such as ‘[a]rchitects, doctors, engineers, attorneys, and others.’” Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978)). 
156.  See generally John J. Laubmeier, Comment, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic 
Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (describing the economic-loss rule as “a 
constantly developing area of law, which may not be fully understood by judges, lawyers, or 
the public at large”). 
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The economic-loss rule was not commonly discussed until “the last 
quarter of the 20th century.”158 Presumably, some of the uncertainties 
relating to the rule will be resolved, or at least illuminated, during the 
drafting of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Loss,159 
which is now underway in the American Law Institute. At present, it seems 
possible––perhaps likely––that the economic-loss rule will be deemed to bar 
recovery for purely economic losses caused by standardized test mis-scoring, 
if the case is litigated on a simple negligence theory. That is the heart of the 
economic-loss rule: negligence, which causes solely economic losses, is not 
actionable. However, it may nevertheless be possible to argue cogently that 
the rule should not apply to such cases. As explained by the Florida Supreme 
Court: 
The prohibition against tort actions to recover solely economic damages for 
those in contractual privity is designed to prevent parties to a contract from 
circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the contract by bringing an 
action for economic loss in tort. Underlying this rule is the assumption that 
the parties to a contract have allocated the economic risks of nonperformance 
through the bargaining process. A party to a contract who attempts to 
circumvent the contractual agreement by making a claim for economic loss 
in tort is, in effect, seeking to obtain a better bargain than originally made. 
Thus, when the parties are in privity, contract principles are generally more 
appropriate for determining remedies for consequential damages that the 
parties have, or could have, addressed through their contractual 
agreement.160 
Standardized test-takers often have no realistic opportunity to bargain 
over the compensation for harm that might be caused by mis-scoring. The 
terms of the test contract are typically offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, 
and in many instances, the test is an essential step in obtaining an education 
or building a career––a step which the test-taker cannot forego or 
                                                                                                                             
157.  See Johnson, Cybersecurity, supra note 94, at 302-03 (discussing exceptions and 
limitations to the economic-loss rule). 
158.  AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 8 cmt. c; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., No. 
MDL 04-1600, 2005 WL 1924331, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2005) (“[T]he economic loss 
doctrine . . . was created by the California Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co., . . . 403 
P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).”). 
159.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 8. 
160.  Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 536-37 (Fla. 
2004) (citation omitted). 
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circumvent. Many agreements between test-takers and testing agencies can 
be fairly viewed as adhesion contracts,161 and therefore some courts may 
decline to hold that injured test-takers are relegated to recovery under the 
terms of the take-it-or-leave-it standardized test contract.162  
Moreover, courts sometimes hold that the economic-loss rule does not 
bar a negligence claim against a person not in privity of contract.163 That 
interpretation of the rule might be extended to the standardized testing 
context, for, as noted above,164 some test-takers are in privity (e.g., students 
who pay to take the SAT) and others are not (e.g., high school students who 
are required to take a state-mandated standardized test in order to graduate). 
Of course, it makes little sense to say that a negligence claim by a test-taker 
who was in privity with the testing agency, but without power to bargain 
over the terms of the contract, is barred from suing for negligence by the 
economic-loss rule, if negligence claims are allowed by persons not in 
privity with the testing agency who were therefore also not able to bargain. 
The better course is for courts to recognize that neither category of plaintiff 
has any real opportunity to negotiate protection from economic harm caused 
by mis-scoring, and that tort remedies should therefore not be foreclosed.  
However, even if the economic-loss rule applies to a mis-scoring case, it 
is possible to escape the force of the rule by framing a claim as one not for 
mere negligence, but for negligent misrepresentation,165 which is an 
important and well-established exception to the economic-loss rule.166 In 
addition, emotional distress is not simply a form of economic loss (even if 
the distress results in out-of-pocket expenditures), but rather a type of 
personal injury. Therefore, the rule does not bar claims for negligent 
                                                                                                                             
161.  See Johnson, Liberating Progress, supra note 104, at 1044-45 (discussing 
adhesion contracts). 
162.  An adhesion contract may be unconscionable and to that extent unenforceable. 
See Susan Rabin & Christopher Q. Pham, Contracts of Adhesion, L.A. LAWYER, Feb. 2006, at 
11 (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985)). 
163.  Indem. Ins., 891 So. 2d at 541 (holding that the rule did not bar action against a 
company, which was neither a manufacturer nor distributor of a product, because the parties 
were not in privity); see also Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1001 (D. 
Minn. 2006) (holding that Minnesota’s independent duty rule did not as a matter of law bar a 
claim by a non-party; “it strikes the Court as unfair to hold . . . that Plaintiffs lack a tort 
remedy because the alleged tort arose in the context of the performance of a contract to which 
they were strangers”). 
164.  See supra Part II.C. 
165.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
166.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 10 (discussing liability for negligent 
misstatements); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B cmt. a (1979) (permitting 
recovery of out-of-pocket losses caused by negligent misrepresentation). 
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infliction of emotional distress,167 although those claims may fail for other 
reasons.168 Actions for defamation, which are sometimes based on 
negligence as to the falsity of a defamatory statement (and other times based 
on more culpable conduct),169 routinely allow recovery for economic 
losses,170 and such recoveries are obviously not barred by the economic-loss 
rule.171 Various other theories discussed below, such as false-light invasion 
of privacy,172 tortious interference,173 and injurious falsehood,174 are usually 
not based on negligence, and therefore are not affected by the economic-loss 
                                                                                                                             
167.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 8 cmt. 8.  
168.  See infra Part III.A.  
169.  See infra Part III.C.  
170.  See Mich. Microtech, Inc. v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 717, 722 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that losses of “economic or pecuniary value” are 
recoverable in a defamation action). But see Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 
996 (D. Minn. 2006) (holding in a case based on mis-scoring of the SAT that “in cases where 
defamation is asserted along with a claim for breach of contract, ‘the defamation must be 
independent of the alleged breach of contract and not a part of the malicious conduct 
associated with the breach’” (quoting Pillsbury Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 425 N.W.2d 
244, 250 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988))). 
171.  See Latino Food Marketers, LLC v. Ole Mexican Foods, Inc., No. 03-C-0190-C, 
2004 WL 632869, at *17 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 29, 2004) (stating that although the plaintiff made 
“a half-hearted attempt to argue that defendant’s defamation counterclaim should be barred by 
the economic loss doctrine, . . . it concede[d] that it ha[d] found no authority directly 
supporting this point”). The court also noted that “in one case the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit assumed that injuries caused by defamation are not included in the meaning of 
‘economic loss.’” Id. (citing Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990)). As 
Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb explained: 
[T]here is little danger of eroding the distinction between tort and contract law by 
allowing a party in a commercial relationship to maintain a cause of action for 
defamation. Damages caused by defamatory remarks are not the sort of loss that 
parties to a contract contemplate when they sit down at the bargaining table . . . . 
Because defamation is almost always extrinsic to a contract, it is unlikely that 
permitting a defamation claim will allow parties to do an “end run around contract 
law,” . . . or obtain double recovery for the same injury.  
Id. (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Wis. 1998)); 
see also Facchina v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 735 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding that an action for defamation, which “protects economic interests as well as [against] 
humiliation and embarrassment,” was not barred by the economic-loss rule). 
172.  See infra Part III.C. 
173.  See infra Part III.D. 
174.  See infra Part III.E. 
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rule. Likewise, in fraud actions,175 which are founded on intentional or 
reckless misrepresentation, economic losses are recoverable in most states.176  
III.  TORT THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
When standardized tests are mis-scored, there may be more than one 
potential defendant. For example, an entity that administers a test may sub-
contract the scoring of the results to a separate independent entity, and then 
rely upon those scores in reporting results to various recipients. Tort liability 
frequently turns upon facts relating to what a defendant did or did not do, and 
the culpability associated with that action or omission (e.g., intent, 
recklessness, or negligence), and other related considerations. It is important 
to remember that not all defendants will be similarly situated. On a particular 
theory, one defendant may be subject to liability and another may not.177 
A.  Negligence and Infliction of Emotional Distress 
In many cases, it may be possible to prove that the mis-scoring of a 
standardized test was the result of negligence.178 For example, erroneous 
results for approximately five thousand takers of the Scholastic Aptitude Test 
were said to have been caused by the fact that “some answer sheets had 
swelled because of moisture.”179 If the exposure to moisture was the result of 
a potential defendant’s carelessly allowing answer sheets to be exposed to 
rain180 or spilled drinks, or stored in a damp basement or a leaky trailer, there 
would be evidence of negligence sufficient to take the case to a jury.  
The duty of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence “means 
that an actor must employ cost-effective measures to prevent” foreseeable 
                                                                                                                             
175.  See infra Part III.B.1.  
176.  See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 20 (3d ed. 2004) 
(“[D]ozens of cases are decided every year awarding economic loss damages for fraud.”); id. 
at 24-26 (discussing cases finding the economic-loss rule inapplicable to misrepresentation 
claims).  
177.  Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 996-1001 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(holding that the plaintiffs in the SAT litigation stated a claim for defamation against the 
entity that scored the tests, but not against the College Board). 
178.  Id. at 1000 (concluding in the SAT litigation that it would be premature to 
dismiss negligence claims against the College Board and the entity that scored the 
examinations). 
179.  See Arenson, Do Better, supra note 60. 
180.  See Arenson, Don’t Want to Know, supra note 102 (“[T]he dampness may have 
come from heavy rains in the Northeast on the day of the test.”). 
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harm.181 As Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo famously said in a different 
context, “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be 
obeyed.”182 Standardized test scoring errors are foreseeable for many 
reasons, and thus there may be a duty to take precautions. As noted earlier,183 
many testing agencies have experienced scoring problems in the past. For 
example, when the College Board discovered that thousands of SAT tests 
had been mis-scored, a representative acknowledged that there had been 
“things like this before, but not of this magnitude.”184 Indeed, during the 
prior six months, “there had been other scanning problems, including one 
with a separately administered chemistry test.”185 In the PRAXIS teacher-test 
litigation,186 which was subsequently settled, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
“ETS ha[d] publicly admitted that it . . . incorrectly scored short essay 
questions on at least nine PRAXIS test administrations.”187 
A finding of negligence might be premised on facts showing that, in light 
of the risks and the costs of precautions, a testing agency should have 
“acquire[d] better scanning software, increase[d] training for test center 
personnel and [made] other improvements in its procedures.”188 Equipment 
can be used “to screen out humidity-tainted answer sheets.”189 Critics argue 
that standardized testing regimes are plagued by a combination of 
insufficient resources, tight deadlines, and “lack of meaningful oversight”190–
–which may be another way of saying that too few resources are being 
devoted to the prevention of foreseeable harm. 
                                                                                                                             
181.  Johnson, Americans Abroad, supra note 95, at 339 & n.152 (discussing the 
Learned Hand balancing test). 
182.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). 
183.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
184.  See Arenson, Technical Problems, supra note 68 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
185.  See id. 
186.  See supra note 44. 
187.  PRAXIS Complaint, supra note 40, at 5. 
188.  See Arenson, Do Better, supra note 60 (describing findings of a report 
commissioned by the College Board to recommend steps to prevent errors in scoring the 
SAT). Presumably, such a report could not be introduced into evidence under the subsequent-
remedial-measures rule. See FED. R. EVID. 407. However, similar testimony might be 
introduced by an expert witness on testing. See Arenson & Henriques, supra note 23 (quoting 
the dean of admissions at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as stating, with reference 
to mis-scoring of SAT exams, that “[t]he story here is not that they made a mistake in the 
scanning and scoring but that they seem to have no fail-safe to alert them directly and 
immediately of a mistake” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189.  Silverstein, supra note 7. 
190.  Winerip, supra note 12 (discussing testing pursuant to the No Child Left Behind 
law). 
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In some cases, a plaintiff may argue that a defendant is liable essentially 
on a negligent hiring theory.191 Such contentions may resonate with merit if 
the scoring of standardized tests, as in the SAT case, is entrusted to an 
enterprise that is “no stranger to botching test scores.”192 The same may also 
be true if inexperienced, low-paid, temporary workers are hired to grade the 
essay portion of a standardized exam.193 
In some cases, aggrieved plaintiffs suing for negligence may seek to 
invoke a res ipsa loquitur analysis.194 They might argue that erroneous 
scoring of standardized examinations is the type of harm that does not occur 
in the absence of negligence, and that the negligent conduct more likely than 
not was caused by the party that exercised physical control195 over the test 
instruments.196 This is a good argument even if the evidence shows that the 
plaintiff contributed to mis-scoring in some way, such as by making pencil 
marks that were too light197 or bad erasures. Under modern comparative 
                                                                                                                             
191.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 19 (citing cases on negligent hiring).  
192.  See SAT Scoring Error, supra note 67 (discussing reliance by the College Board 
on Pearson, a company which, in 2002, had paid a “multimillion-dollar settlement . . . for 
scoring errors in Minnesota that affected more than 8,000 students”). 
193.  Cf. High Stakes, supra note 1 (“After a newspaper disclosed . . . that Kelly 
Services was advertising for $10-an-hour temporary workers to score the writing portion of . . 
. [a Florida standardized test], the agency insisted the workers had college degrees and half 
were teachers.”). 
194.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 17 (”The factfinder may infer that the 
defendant has been negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s physical harm is a type 
of accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of which 
the defendant is the relevant member.”). 
195.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 348 (discussing the “key question” of 
control). 
196.  This type of claim is distinguishable from some education-related decisions that 
have rejected res ipsa loquitur arguments. For example, in Campaign For Fiscal Equity, Inc. 
v. State, the court found: 
Although plaintiffs would most likely disagree with the characterization, their 
position is essentially a form of res ipsa loquitur: the fact that 30% of City students 
drop out and an additional 10% obtain only a GED must mean that the City schools 
fail to offer the opportunity of a sound basic education, which is ultimately the State’s 
responsibility (pursuant to the Education Article), and therefore the State’s funding 
mechanism must be the cause of the problem. 
744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 143 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d in part, modified in part, 801 N.E.2d 326 
(N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part, modified in part, 861 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006). Whether a student 
obtains a high school degree is a matter not within the exclusive control of the school, but 
depends upon other factors, including whether students attend classes and work hard. 
197.  See Arenson & Henriques, supra note 23 (discussing errors in scoring the SAT 
where “scanners did not pick up some lightly marked answers”). 
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principles, negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not preclude reliance 
on res ipsa loquitur.198 
However, even if negligence can be shown, it is unlikely that an 
aggrieved test-taker or any other plaintiff could succeed on a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from standardized test 
mis-scoring. The law on negligent infliction is very unfriendly to plaintiffs. 
They are likely to succeed only where they suffer actual or threatened 
physical harm199 or observe the death or grievous injury of a loved one,200 or 
where there are other similar dramatic facts.201 Dissemination of incorrect 
test scores––sometimes to third parties, rather than to the test-taker––comes 
nowhere close to the usual threshold for recovering damages in an action for 
negligent infliction. 
It is fair to say that “[n]o area of tort law is more unsettled than 
compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress . . . and there are 
often substantial differences in the requirements, or in their interpretation, 
from one jurisdiction to the next.”202 Yet, in virtually all states, it is 
                                                                                                                             
198.  See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) 
(holding that under comparative negligence a res ipsa loquitur plaintiff is required to show 
only that the “defendant’s inferred negligence was, more probably than not, a cause [not the 
cause] of the injury, . . . even though plaintiff’s negligent acts or omissions may also have 
contributed to the injury” (second emphasis added)); Cyr v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 
485 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Vt. 1984) (“Contributory negligence no longer bars recovery in a case 
brought under a res ipsa loquitur theory.”); see also Giles v. City of New Haven, 636 A.2d 
1335, 1338-39 (Conn. 1994) (holding that an elevator operator could invoke res ipsa loquitur 
even though she had some control over the movement of the elevator, and even if the 
operator’s negligence may have also contributed to her injury). See generally JOHNSON & 
GUNN, supra note 86, at 351-52 (discussing the relationship of res ipsa loquitur to the 
plaintiff’s conduct). 
199.  See, e.g., Jalowy v. Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A.2d 698, 710 (R.I. 2003) (“Only 
two classes of persons may bring claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress: those 
within the ‘zone-of-danger’ who are physically endangered by the acts of a negligent 
defendant, and bystanders related to a victim whom they witness being injured.”). 
200.  See, e.g., Robinson v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (“To establish a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania 
law, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he or she was near the scene of an accident or negligent 
act; (2) shock or distress resulted from a direct emotional impact caused by the sensory or 
contemporaneous observance of the accident, as opposed to learning of the accident from 
others after its occurrence; and (3) he or she is closely related to the injured victim.”); Cox 
Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Wootten, 59 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tex. App. 2001) (recognizing an 
exception to a general rule of non-recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress that 
“is allowed for a bystander who witnesses a serious or fatal accident”). 
201.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1975) (allowing recovery 
based on negligently erroneous death message and shipment of body). 
202.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 577. 
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exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prevail. In some states, the tort of 
negligent-infliction is very narrowly defined.203 However, even where that is 
not true, a negligent-infliction plaintiff must establish severe emotional 
distress.204 In cases involving intentional205 rather than negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, many states hold that recovery is available only for 
intolerably severe distress206––distress so great that it is “debilitating”207 and 
“a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope.”208 
Thus, courts have written: 
“Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that 
is so extreme and outrageous that it goes beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, is regarded as atrocious, is utterly intolerable in a civilized society, 
                                                                                                                             
203.  See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (“[T]here is no 
general duty in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress. A claimant may recover 
mental anguish damages only in connection with defendant’s breach of some other legal 
duty.”). But see Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress in Texas: Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 465 (2002) 
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s construction of the tort). 
204.  See, e.g., Basnight v. Diamond Developers, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 754, 768 
(M.D.N.C. 2001) (“Although an allegation of ordinary negligence will suffice, a plaintiff must 
also allege that severe emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result of such 
negligence.”). 
205.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1979) (stating elements of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
206.  See Kalantar v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 402 F. Supp. 2d 130, 146 (D.D.C. 
2005) (holding that the failure of an airline passenger to corroborate, through medical bills or 
other sources, claims that he suffered severe emotional distress as result of being arrested 
precluded a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional distress under Virginia law); Harris v. 
Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977) (“[T]he tort requires the plaintiff to show that he 
suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant’s conduct.”); Williams v. 
First Tenn. Nat’l Corp., 97 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding a former employee, 
who, at the time he was fired, “was emotionally reeling,” “lost his appetite,” and became 
“cranky,” failed to prove that he suffered unendurable distress, because “within a few weeks, 
he was able to bounce back” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Villaseñor v. Villaseñor, 911 
S.W.2d 411, 417 (Tex. App. 1995) (finding that a former husband, who alleged that he was 
the victim of his former wife’s manipulation of their children, did not prove unendurable 
distress); Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (“‘[L]iability arises only when the 
emotional distress is extreme, and only where the distress is so severe that no reasonable 
person could be expected to endure it.’” (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1979))). 
207.  Cochran v. City of Norton, No. 20418, 2001 WL 866276, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 1, 2001) (citing Cherney v. City of Amherst, 584 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
208.  Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983). 
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and is of a nature that is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, 
mental distress of a very serious kind.”209 
Many intentional-infliction claims founder because of the inability of the 
facts to meet this exceedingly demanding damages threshold. For example, 
one recent case determined that the children of parents who were wrongly 
incarcerated failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because the “children’s drop in grades and attitude problems [were] 
not evidence of the type of severe distress, unendurable by a reasonable 
person,” that the tort requires.210 It goes without saying that if severe damage 
is required in cases of intentionally tortious conduct––which some courts say 
must be so extreme and outrageous as to “strike to the very core of one’s 
being, threatening to shatter the frame upon which one’s emotional fabric is 
hung”211––at least the same showing of severe damage should be necessary 
in cases of mere negligence. 
In addition, “most courts hold that negligent harm to property, by itself, 
is an insufficient predicate for an award of mental-distress damages, at least 
if the harm occurs outside of the plaintiff’s presence.”212 The latter rule might 
cover cases where answer sheets are lost213 or destroyed, and logically might 
be extended to cases where defendants negligently interfere with plaintiffs’ 
intellectual, rather than physical, property interests (if any)214 in test results, 
such as the scores reported based on an exam. In cases involving the 
intentional tort of conversion, there is a tendency for courts to treat 
                                                                                                                             
209.  Myslow v. New Milford Sch. Dist., No. 3:03CV496 (MRK), 2006 WL 473735, at 
*16 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Miner v. Town of Cheshire, 126 F. 
Supp. 2d 184, 194 (D. Conn. 2000)). 
210.  Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1030 (7th Cir. 2006).  
211.  Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1064 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1986); see also McKenzie v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 362, 379 (D. 
Md. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the “shatter-the-frame” standard). 
212.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 583 (citing cases). 
213.  Cf. Kubistal v. Hirsch, No. 98C3838, 1999 WL 90625, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 
1999) (dismissing, in a suit based in part on lost standardized test results, pendent state claims 
for negligent supervision and intentional infliction of emotional distress, because federal 
claims were barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 
214.  A discussion of the scope of intellectual property rights in test results is beyond 
the scope of this Article. Merely because the information relates to a person does not mean 
that the person has a legally protected interest in that information. Cf. Dwyer v. Am. Express 
Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting a privacy claim relating to the 
defendants’ practice of renting information regarding cardholder spending habits).  
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intellectual and physical property similarly.215 If that same judicial approach 
carries over to negligence actions, it is likely that neither negligent 
interference with physical property, nor negligent interference with 
intellectual property, will support an action for negligent causation of 
emotional distress. There is no reason to hold that emotional distress based 
on negligent interference with intellectual property is more readily actionable 
than negligent interference with physical property. The law on compensation 
for emotional distress has long been concerned with the genuineness of 
claims,216 and it has often seized upon some shred of physical impact or 
physical consequences as a basis for allowing recovery that would have been 
refused absent such physical corroboration.217 
There may be other obstacles to recovering for negligently caused 
psychic suffering in particular situations. For example, if a negligence claim 
based on erroneous standardized test scoring is brought against a public 
entity, the defendant may be immune from suit under the discretionary-
function doctrine.218 
For all of these reasons, there is little reason to think that erroneous 
scoring of standardized tests will generate meritorious suits for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, no matter how real that distress may be.219 
                                                                                                                             
215.  Cf. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an 
Internet domain name was a form of intangible property which could serve as the basis for a 
conversion claim). 
216.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 581-82 (discussing how genuineness is 
established in negligent infliction cases). 
217.  See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 146, at 361-64 (discussing the reluctance of 
courts to allow recovery for negligently inflicted mental disturbance alone and their greater 
willingness to permit damages in cases of physical injury or impact); see also Robinson v. 
May Dep’t Stores Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Manifestation of physical 
injury is necessary to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.”). 
218.  See Myslow v. New Milford Sch. Dist., No. 3:03CV496 (MRK), 2006 WL 
473735, at *17 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2006) (finding that a claim of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress against school defendants, relating to accommodation of a student with 
learning disabilities, was precluded by common law and statutory immunity for discretionary 
governmental acts). 
219.  To be sure, the processing of test results can cause emotional distress. A few 
years ago, I gave final grades to about eighty-five first-semester Torts students based in part 
on an objective-question examination that had been scored by the university test center. At the 
beginning of the second semester, a student came into my office to review her exam. As we 
inspected the printout of scores from the test center, I spotted a problem and immediately 
suspected that the test results were wrong. I excused myself, and raced to the test center. After 
a frantic hour, I determined that all of the test scores were correct, but that only the printout 
was erroneous––having substituted for the answer key the answers of a student who had failed 
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However, the same type of damages may be available under some other legal 
theory. For example, emotional distress damages are frequently available in 
actions for defamation220 and can occasionally be recovered in a suit for 
fraud.221 If those theories apply, the unavailability of the same damages 
under a negligent-infliction claim may be largely irrelevant. Of course, the 
theory of liability may affect such matters as whether the losses are covered 
by insurance, which in many cases is a pivotal consideration. Many 
insurance policies exclude coverage for harm caused by intentional222 or 
fraudulent conduct,223 but cover harm caused by negligence, including 
negligently inflicted emotional distress.224 
B.  Misrepresentation 
In a limited range of cases, erroneous standardized test results might 
support claims for misrepresentation. In thinking about this subject, it is 
                                                                                                                             
to fill-in his or her secret exam number. I was relieved and the students were not harmed, but 
there was plenty of emotional distress in the interim. 
220.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (recognizing that 
among the forms of harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood that are routinely recoverable are 
“personal humiliation” and “mental anguish and suffering”). 
221.  See, e.g., Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991) (joining 
jurisdictions that allow the recovery of emotional damages that are the natural and proximate 
result of fraud); Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 667 A.2d 1321, 1328 (D.C. 1995) 
(“[U]pon proof of intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff may recover emotional damages 
that are the natural and proximate result of the defendant’s conduct.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). But see Zeigler v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1052 (N.D. Iowa 2003) 
(determining that Iowa will not allow emotional distress damages in a fraud action). 
222.  See 7A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 
4501.09, at 267 (Walter F. Berdal ed., rev. ed. 1979) (“Intentional injuries, generally, are not 
covered.”); cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. 
REV. 903, 923 (2004) (noting that “insurance companies seeking to avoid coverage have 
raised transferred-intent arguments” to avoid having accidental harm characterized as 
negligence). 
223.  See LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 161:19 (3d ed. 
2005) (discussing exclusion of coverage for fraud); id. § 131:21 (“Attorneys [sic] professional 
liability insurance policies frequently exclude from coverage any ‘dishonest, fraudulent, 
criminal or malicious act or omission.’” (quoting Brooks v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1358, 
1359 (5th Cir.), clarified, 832 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1987))). 
224.  Cf. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 604 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring) 
(explaining how a plaintiff tried to frame a case involving intentional videotaping of sexual 
conduct as one for negligent infliction of emotional distress in order to reach insurance 
coverage). 
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useful to differentiate two distinct misrepresentation theories (fraud225 and 
negligent misrepresentation226) and two potential groups of plaintiffs (test-
takers and other test-score recipients). 
1.  Fraud  
The chief obstacle to a fraud claim will be proving scienter.227 
Presumably, it will be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove that a testing 
agency knowingly distributed erroneous results. However, establishing 
scienter based on recklessness will be easier, and sometimes possible. When 
the maker of a statement knowingly lacks confidence in the truth that a 
statement implies, the statement, if false, is fraudulently made.228 Thus, if a 
testing agency has doubts about the correctness of test results, but 
nevertheless distributes those results without disclosing its concerns, the 
agency acts with scienter and could be sued for fraud, if the test results are 
erroneous and cause harm by inducing reliance.  
There is a well-recognized tort duty to correct false statements that, 
although believed to have been true when made, are later discovered to be 
false.229 The duty to correct continues until the recipient of the information is 
no longer able to protect his or her own interests by avoiding reliance upon 
                                                                                                                             
225.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-526 (1979) (discussing liability for 
fraudulent misrepresentation). 
226.  See id. § 552 (discussing negligent misrepresentation, which provides a remedy 
for physical harm or economic losses resulting from carelessly false or misleading 
statements). 
227.  See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.10, at 
981 (2005 ed.) (indicating that scienter is established by evidence showing that the defendant 
acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).  
228.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1979) (providing that a 
misrepresentation is “fraudulent” if the speaker “(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as 
he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation 
that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that 
he states or implies”). 
229.  See id. § 551 cmt. h (“One who, having made a representation which when made 
was true or believed to be so, remains silent after he has learned that it is untrue and that the 
person to whom it is made is relying upon it in a transaction with him, is morally and legally 
in the same position as if he knew that his statement was false when made.”); Johnson, 
Cybersecurity, supra note 94, at 291 n.242 (collecting citations). A similar ethical obligation 
is imposed on attorneys with respect to statements to courts. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to a tribunal by the lawyer.”). 
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the utterance that the speaker has discovered to be erroneous.230 This theory 
of liability would be applicable to cases where a testing agency discovers 
errors in previously distributed test results, but neglects to disclose those 
errors in a timely fashion. 
Suppose that test results distributed in November are discovered in 
December to contain errors, but the problem is not disclosed to test-takers or 
other score recipients until March. Is the nondisclosure of the errors between 
December and March the basis for a lawsuit? Presumably, a testing agency 
would have a conditional privilege to delay revelation of the suspected errors 
long enough to conduct an investigation of the facts.231 The investigation 
might take weeks or months. For example, when the College Board was 
alerted to possible problems with the October 2005 SAT, it launched an 
investigation of not merely the October test, but the subsequent exams in 
November, December, and January, for a total of 1.5 million investigated 
exams in all.232 A privilege to delay revelation of information about possible 
scoring errors long enough to investigate the facts would help to prevent the 
type of harm that could be caused by erroneous reports about suspect results, 
and would also be consistent with the testing agency’s own legitimate 
interest in taking reasonable steps to protect its reputation.233 However, once 
the error has been or should have been verified, it is incumbent on the testing 
                                                                                                                             
230.  See Johnson, Cybersecurity, supra note 94, at 291-92 (“The purpose of the rule is 
to avoid deception that causes harm.”); see also McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 
458, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding, in a corporate context, that “[t]he making of the original 
statements [that the plaintiff would be named president], the discovery of their falsehood, and 
the failure to correct them before plaintiff relied on them were ‘elements in a continuing 
course of conduct’ capable of establishing fraud” (quoting Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 
72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (Ct. App. 1968))). 
231.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-596 (1979) (discussing conditional 
privilege in defamation law). Similar principles have been applied in other areas of the law. 
See id. § 652G (applying conditional privileges from defamation law to a false-light invasion 
of privacy action); see also Arenson, Tests Escaped Check, supra note 114 (quoting a College 
Board official as stating that the “board had worked as fast as it could, including on nights and 
weekends, to assess and correct the errors” in scoring the SAT). 
232.  See Additional Detail, supra note 66 (detailing scope of investigation). 
233.  Cf. Scott v. Educ. Testing Serv., 600 A.2d 500, 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991) (stating that a testing agency “has an interest in assuring the accuracy of the test results 
it reports and the predictions it thereby makes”); K.D. v. Educ. Testing Serv., 386 N.Y.S.2d 
747, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (“[T]he accuracy of its predictions is defendant’s sole stock in trade. 
The less accurate as a forecaster its tests are, the less value they have to the . . . schools. Thus, 
if defendant reasonably believed that the test scores . . . did not accurately reflect [the 
plaintiff’s] aptitude, . . . it acted within its right to protect its own image . . . in canceling 
plaintiff’s scores and requiring him to take a retest.”).  
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agency to promptly disclose the information234––provided that the reliance 
on the erroneous information could still be avoided.  
On the posited facts concerning failure to correct, is there anything a 
test-taker or other score recipient could do to prevent erroneous test results 
from causing harm? In many cases, “yes.” A test-taker who has applied for 
admission to a college or university could advise that institution of the 
unreliability of the results. A student who eschewed application to another 
educational program because the erroneous results appeared uncompetitive 
might still apply there for admission. And a student might forebear incurring 
the costs of preparing for and retaking the standardized test until correct 
results are available. In addition, an educational institution informed of 
documented or potential errors might be able to delay admissions decisions 
or scholarship offers, or might re-consider the files of students who were 
previously rejected. It seems possible that, in some cases, liability may be 
imposed under the duty-to-correct theory. This is particularly true if there is 
evidence not merely of non-disclosure of the errors, but that the testing 
agency hid that information or unreasonably hoped that the problem would 
not be discovered.235 
2.  Negligent Misrepresentation 
Actions for negligent misrepresentation (as opposed to fraud) would 
likely follow a similar analysis in cases against commercial providers of 
testing services, since liability for negligent misrepresentation extends to 
persons who fail to exercise care in statements made in the course of 
                                                                                                                             
234.  Similar privileges to delay notification for purposes of investigation are 
recognized throughout the law. For example, a statutory duty to notify data subjects that the 
security of their personal information has been breached may be suspended pending 
investigation. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(a) (Supp. 2006) (“[N]otice shall be made 
in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement . . . or with any measures necessary to determine the 
scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity, security, and confidentiality of the 
data system.”); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/10 (West Supp. 2006) (similar); see also 
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,739, 15,744, 15,747 (Mar. 29, 
2005), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/7/73262.pdf (discussing what constitutes 
prompt notification). 
235.  Cf. Karen W. Arenson, SAT Problems Even Larger Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2006, at A21, available at 2006 WLNR 4792445 (quoting a college vice president as 
stating, with respect to revelations of SAT scoring errors, that “[e]verybody appears to be 
telling half-truths” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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business operations.236 The scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation 
is often more tightly limited than for deceit.237 However, those limitations 
would not affect aggrieved paying test-takers or most other score-recipients. 
Cases that limit the scope of negligent-misrepresentation liability more 
strictly than by a rule of foreseeable reliance generally do either of two 
things. The cases either follow the Restatement approach or they impose a 
requirement of privity or “near-privity.”238 Under the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, liability extends only to a “person or [a member] of a limited group 
of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the defendant] intends to supply 
the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it,”239 and only 
with respect to “reliance . . . in a transaction that [the defendant] intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a 
substantially similar transaction.”240  
The educational institutions that receive standardized test results related 
to admissions applications would readily qualify as plaintiffs under the 
Restatement test, since in such cases it would be clear both that they might 
rely, and what type of reliance might occur.241 In addition, such direct 
                                                                                                                             
236.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1979) (stating that the rule on 
negligent misrepresentation applies to “[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false 
information” (emphasis added)); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 10 (“An actor 
who in a business undertaking negligently supplies false information to guide another in a 
business transaction is subject to liability for pecuniary harm resulting from the other’s 
justifiable reliance upon the information if the actor supplies the information in an advisory 
capacity or other circumstances justify imposing a duty of care upon the actor.”). 
237.  See Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers 
About Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 565-66 & n.172 (2004) (discussing 
competing views on the scope of liability for negligent misrepresentation (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1979))). 
238.  See, e.g., Hedges v. Durrance, 834 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2003) (“[I]n order to sustain a 
cause of action against an attorney for negligent misrepresentation, a third party must 
demonstrate ‘a relationship so close as to approach that of privity.’” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Bovee v. Gravel, 811 A.2d 137, 142 (Vt. 2002))); see also BERNARD S. 
MEYER ET AL., THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS: 1932-2003, at 475-77 
(2006) (discussing the “amorphous” nature of privity, and the importance, under New York 
law, of conduct linking the defendant to the plaintiff in negligent misrepresentation cases). 
239.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1979). 
240.  Id. § 552(2)(b); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 10 (discussing liability 
for negligent misstatement). 
241.  Cf. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 344 (McKinney 2000) (“[The] score of any test subject 
shall not be released or disclosed by the test agency to any person, organization, corporation, 
association, college, university, or governmental agency or subdivision unless specifically 
authorized by the test subject.”). 
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recipients of erroneous test-scores would probably also satisfy a privity/near-
privity test. In cases involving the direct transmission of an erroneous 
document, there is the kind of one-to-one dealing that substitutes for 
privity.242 
A test-taker who pays a fee to take an exam would also have no trouble 
satisfying a scope-of-liability requirement. The payment would place the 
test-taker in privity with the testing agency and would thus satisfy any type 
of standing requirement for negligent misrepresentation—foreseeability of 
reliance, intended reliance under the Restatement rule by a member of a 
limited group in a known or similar transaction, or privity/near-privity. 
                                                                                                                             
The precise details of the reliance need not be foreseen, so long as the defendant had 
reason to foresee the general nature and magnitude of reliance. Thus, it would presumably 
make no difference whether the reliance by an educational institution that received the 
erroneous score resulted in the awarding or denial of a full scholarship versus a partial 
scholarship. As the Restatement explains: 
There may be many minor differences that do not affect the essential character of the 
transaction. The question may be one of the extent of the departure that the maker of 
the representation understands is to be expected. If he is told that the information that 
he supplies is to be used in applying to a particular bank for a loan of $10,000, the 
fact that the loan is made by that bank for $15,000 will not necessarily mean that the 
transaction is a different one. But if the loan is for $500,000, the very difference in 
amount would lead the ordinary borrower or lender to regard it as a different kind of 
transaction.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. j (1979).  
However, it is easy to posit a case of reliance that might be beyond the scope of the 
Restatement rule. Suppose, for example, that an aunt promises to give her nephew a 
condominium where he can live while pursuing his legal studies, if he scores more than 160 
on the LSAT. Upon receiving his erroneous test results overstating his performance, he shows 
a copy to his aunt, who in reliance thereon transfers title to the condominium to her nephew. It 
might well be argued that it would be unfair to hold the negligent testing agency liable for the 
loss incurred by the aunt in reliance on the erroneous score. The agency neither knew that the 
aunt would rely on the report, nor could have foreseen the nature of the transaction in which 
that reliance might occur. Without such information, the agency had no reason to know how 
much to spend on precautions to avoid mis-scoring. 
242.  See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 120 (N.Y. 
1985) (holding that direct communications between a borrower’s accountant and a lender 
sufficiently approached privity to allow an action for negligent misrepresentation); cf. LaSalle 
Nat’l Bank v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 729 N.Y.S.2d 671, 675 (App. Div. 2001) (finding no 
linkage that would support a claim for negligent misrepresentation where it was “not alleged 
that [the accounting firm] ever acknowledged [a] letter or otherwise acted to confirm the 
letter’s receipt”). 
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3.  Duty to Non-Paying Test-takers 
A different analysis would be required in cases of non-paying test-takers, 
such as elementary students who take state-required standardized 
examinations. First, those test-takers might only be able to establish 
foreseeable reliance, not intended reliance (under the Restatement rule) or 
privity/near-privity. Second, there would also be an important issue relating 
to duty. Some cases––such as suits dealing with drug testing and other 
medical examinations––have held that the party administering the test owes 
no duty of care to the test subject, but only to the party paying for the test.243 
Without a duty to exercise care on the part of the defendant, a plaintiff would 
be unable to sue for negligent misrepresentation, since duty is an essential 
element of any negligence-based claim. 
However, a number of cases are to the contrary and hold that a testing 
agency, even if employed by a third-party, owes a duty of care to the test-
taker.244 One lawsuit with apparent relevance to tort liability for erroneous 
scoring of standardized tests is Merrick v. Thomas.245 There, the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska held that a merit commission owed a duty to a job 
                                                                                                                             
243.  See, e.g., Hall v. United Labs, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ohio 1998) 
(finding that a doctor and laboratory that analyzed random drug test results did not have a 
duty to employee that would support a negligence claim); see also Mission Petroleum 
Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705, 715 (Tex. 2003) (holding that employers who 
conduct in-house urine specimen collection under the Department of Transportation 
regulations for random drug-testing of employees owe no duty of care to employees to 
conduct the drug test with reasonable care); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 
347, 354-56 (Tex. 1995) (holding, in a case where a prospective employee sued a laboratory 
that was under contract with the prospective employer to perform a drug test, that the 
laboratory owed no duty to warn either the employee or the employer of possible causes of 
positive results other than using drugs). 
244.  See, e.g., Webb v. T.D., 951 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Mont. 1997) (finding that a 
physician who performed an independent examination of a worker at the request of her 
employer’s workers’ compensation carrier owed a duty to the worker to exercise ordinary care 
to discover conditions posing imminent danger to the worker’s physical or mental well-being 
and to take reasonable steps to communicate such conditions to the worker); Sharpe v. St. 
Luke’s Hosp., 821 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Pa. 2003) (holding that a hospital that contracted with an 
employer to perform drug testing owed an employee a duty of reasonable care with regard to 
collection and handling of her urine specimen); Duncan v. Afton, Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 746 
(Wyo. 1999) (similar). See generally Amy Newman & Jay M. Feinman, Liability of a 
Laboratory for Negligent Employment or Pre-employment Drug Testing, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 
473, 488 (1999) (recognizing a split of authority and arguing that a “laboratory has a duty to 
inform the employer of the relevant considerations surrounding drug testing and . . . to act 
reasonably during the course of performing the test”). 
245.  522 N.W.2d 402 (Neb. 1994). 
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applicant to score a test accurately.246 The plaintiff, after receiving an offer of 
employment from the sheriff’s department, resigned her full-time job at her 
former place of employment.247 However, she was subsequently terminated 
by the sheriff’s department following discovery that her hiring was the result 
of an incorrect test score.248 The court wrote: 
The merit commission could foresee that Merrick, by the act of applying, 
desired the job and would rely on the results of a prerequisite test for that 
job. It is reasonably foreseeable that an inaccurate passing score could result 
in Merrick’s name being given to the sheriff as a qualified applicant and that, 
approximately 6 months after taking the test, Merrick would be offered a job 
that she was not qualified for. Last, it is reasonably foreseeable that 
acceptance of the offer would, with a high degree of certainty, cause injury 
when officials discovered the true test score. The defendants argue that the 
only duty owed is to the sheriff who receives the test score . . . . [However], 
the duty owed Merrick is rooted in common law.249 
Of course, even if a duty of reasonable care is owed to a test-taker, there 
is another obstacle to recovery. If the claim is framed as negligent 
misrepresentation, it is essential to prove the plaintiff relied upon the 
negligently false statement.250 Sometimes, it will be difficult or impossible to 
establish such reliance by a preponderance of the evidence. 
C.  Defamation and False-Light Invasion of Privacy 
A statement is not defamatory251 unless it carries with it the sting of 
disgrace.252 To be actionable as libel or slander, an utterance must adversely 
                                                                                                                             
246.  Id. at 406-07. 
247.  Id. at 406. 
248.  Id. 
249.  Id. at 406-07. 
250.  See Hall v. United Labs, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ohio 1998) 
(finding, in an action based on incorrect drug-test results, that the plaintiff had not pled 
sufficient facts to establish reliance on the representation). 
251.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1979) (“A communication is 
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of 
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”). 
252.  See McCulley v. Home Indem. Co., 1987 WL 19727, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 
4, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (“[T]he element of disgrace is key to a determination of libel. . 
. . [B]ecause today many minor offenses may be punished criminally, certain crimes, 
especially traffic offenses, may not give rise to the same degree of social disgrace.”); 
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reflect on the personal character of the plaintiff,253 such as by subjecting the 
plaintiff to “hatred, ridicule or contempt.”254 A defamatory statement must so 
tend255 to “harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of 
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with 
him.”256 Communications falling short of this standard will not support a 
libel, or slander, claim.257  
Many standardized test score errors are of a minor magnitude. A report 
understating a test-taker’s performance by twenty-five, or perhaps even fifty, 
points on the 2400-point SAT, probably is so unlikely to subject the test-
taker to the opprobrium of the community that a court should not entertain a 
resulting defamation claim. De minimis non curat lex.258 Defamation actions 
seeking to redress a minor scoring error may be dismissed under the 
                                                                                                                             
Shallenberger v. Scoggins-Tomlinson, Inc., 439 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) 
(holding that a statement regarding a practice of the real estate industry could not be 
reasonably interpreted as disgracing a realtor, and thus was not defamatory); Chastain v. 
Kansas City Star, 50 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (“Defamatory words ‘must be of 
such a nature that the court can presume, as a matter of law, that they will tend to disgrace and 
degrade the person . . . [and] expose him to public hatred, contempt or disgrace.’” (quoting 
Carey v. Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 859 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993))); McConkey v. 
Flathead Elec. Coop., 125 P.3d 1121, 1130 n.2 (Mont. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff failed 
to prove defamation where he neglected to show how a statement “would tend to degrade or 
disgrace him”); Vitteck v. Wash. Broad. Co., 389 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) 
(“‘[Defamation] necessarily . . . involves the idea of disgrace . . . .’” (quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971))); McCann v. Shell Oil Co., 551 A.2d 696, 
697-98 (R.I. 1988) (stating that to be actionable a statement must be “defamatory, in the sense 
that the material imputes disgrace”); Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 277 N.W. 177, 180 (Wis. 
1938) (finding that it was not libelous to call someone an “arrested case of tuberculosis” 
because while “[i]t may be unfortunate, . . . it is no disgrace to be tubercular. Contracting the 
disease is not due, as in some cases of disease, to any immorality”), overruled in part by 
Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 113 N.W.2d 135 (Wis. 1962).  
253.  Cf. Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706, 715 (La. 1999) (“Defamation involves 
the invasion of a person’s interest in his or her reputation and good name.”). 
254.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. b (1979). 
255.  “[I]t is not necessary that the communication actually cause harm to another’s 
reputation or deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Its [defamatory] 
character depends upon its general tendency to have such an effect.” Id. § 559 cmt. d. 
256.  Id. § 559. 
257.  See Agnant v. Shakur, 30 F. Supp. 2d 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that an 
allegedly false accusation that plaintiff had worked as a federal undercover informant was not 
defamatory). 
258.  “The law does not concern itself with trifles.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 8 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
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substantial-truth rule, which bars recovery based on statements that, though 
literally false, are substantially correct.259 
A scoring error of greater magnitude will warrant more extensive judicial 
consideration, such as test results on the 2400-point SAT that are understated 
by, say, 200, 300, or 400 points. At some juncture, the magnitude of the error 
will be so great as to disgrace the test-taker and cause others to think less of 
him or her. Statements that impute incompetence in business, trade, or 
profession are readily actionable as libel and slander.260 Mis-scoring 
plaintiffs may be able to invoke successfully this type of precedent to mount 
defamation claims in cases involving sizeable scoring errors. This line of 
reasoning will be particularly appealing where an erroneous score 
precipitates clear harm, such as by causing a student to be denied a diploma, 
degree, or essential professional credential.261 In such cases, a defendant 
testing agency publishes to those to whom it disseminates test scores false 
facts purporting to show that the test-taker is not “competent.” 
The “publication” requirement for libel and slander is satisfied by 
intentional or negligent communication of the false statement to a third 
                                                                                                                             
259.  See, e.g., Swindall v. Cox Enters., Inc., 558 S.E.2d 788, 790-91 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2002) (finding that statements that a former Congressman had “lied about drug-money 
laundering” were substantially true, even though the former Congressman had not been 
charged with any substantive offenses, because he had been convicted of perjury for giving 
false testimony to a grand jury to conceal his involvement in discussions about money 
laundering); Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 606, 607-08 (Idaho 2002) (finding that an 
article’s statement that an attorney had relocated from California to Idaho at about the same 
time as members of a white supremacist group was substantially true even though two years 
separated their moves); UTV of San Antonio, Inc. v. Ardmore, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 609, 611-13 
(Tex. App. 2002) (finding that a statement that an inspector had found roaches at a daycare 
center was not actionable because it was no more damaging than a more accurate statement 
that the inspector had noted allegations by staff members about roaches); Provencio v. 
Paradigm Media, Inc., 44 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that a postcard 
identifying the plaintiff as a registered sex offender was substantially true, even though the 
card bore a misleading return address that implied that it had been sent by the government 
rather than by a news organization); see also JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 971 (“A 
trivial inaccuracy in a largely correct account will not give rise to liability . . . ‘Jones murdered 
his wife at 9:15 last night’ is not actionable if in fact Jones murdered his wife at 9:30, or even 
last week.”). 
260.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (1979) (discussing slanderous 
allegations of incompetence in business, trade, or profession); see also Costello v. Hardy, 864 
So. 2d 129, 141 (La. 2004) (holding that allegations calling into question an attorney’s skill 
were defamatory). 
261.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 illus. 4 (1979) (indicating there may 
be liability for defamation where “A, says to B that C, a lawyer, is ignorant and unqualified to 
practice law”).  
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person who understands the defamatory utterance.262 This standard is 
satisfied where a testing agency provides test results directly to a person 
other than the test-taker. It is even possible that a testing agency may be held 
liable for re-publication of an erroneous score by the test-taker. While the 
originator of a defamatory statement is generally not responsible for its re-
publication by the subject of the false and defamatory statement, that is 
because the subject is normally aware of the defamatory content, and has a 
duty to avoid or mitigate damages.263 However, re-transmission by the 
plaintiff of a known falsehood should be distinguished from cases of 
unwitting transmission of a defamatory message whose falsehood is 
unknown. “If the defamed person’s transmission of the communication to the 
third person was made . . . without an awareness of the [false and] 
defamatory nature of the matter and if the circumstances indicated that 
communication to a third party would be likely, a publication may properly 
be held to have occurred.”264 
Unlike defamation, an action for false-light invasion of privacy may be 
based on a statement that is highly offensive, but not so bad as to be 
disgraceful.265 In that regard, it may be easier for a small scoring error to be 
actionable as false-light rather than as libel or slander. However, false-light 
suits based on standardized test mis-scoring are likely to fail for two reasons. 
The first concerns the degree to which the statement is disseminated, and the 
second relates to culpability.  
While defamation is actionable if a false statement is communicated to 
just one person,266 false-light requires “publicity,”267 meaning that the 
                                                                                                                             
262.  See Economopoulos v. A. G. Pollard Co., 105 N.E. 896, 896 (Mass. 1914) 
(holding that no cause of action was stated due to lack of publication where one clerk accused 
the plaintiff in English of stealing a handkerchief, and no one was present, and a second clerk 
made a similar accusation in Greek, but the persons present (other than the plaintiff) did not 
understand the language); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1979) 
(recognizing liability for intentional and negligent publication). 
263.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. m (1979); see also infra note 
269 and accompanying text (discussing compelled self-publication). 
264.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. m (1979). 
265.  Cf. id. § 652E illus. 3 (offering this example: “A is a renowned poet. B publishes 
in his magazine a spurious inferior poem, signed with A’s name. Regardless of whether the 
poem is so bad as to subject B to liability for libel, B is subject to liability to A for invasion of 
privacy”). 
266.  See id. § 577(1) (discussing “[p]ublication of defamatory matter . . . to one other 
than the person defamed”). 
267.  See id. § 652E (requiring “publicity”); id. § 652E cmt. a (erroneously cross-
referencing comment a of § 652C, rather than § 652D); see also Andrews v. Stallings, 892 
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utterance must be so widely disbursed that it is substantially certain to 
become a matter of community knowledge.268 In many cases, standardized 
test results are communicated only to a small group of recipients. Courts 
have generally rejected the theory of compelled self-publication in 
defamation law,269 and it is likely that they will follow the same path in false-
light cases, which require a wider degree of dissemination.270 Thus, the 
plaintiff’s own knowing repetition of the falsity cannot serve as the predicate 
for establishing the wide-spread awareness of the falsity within the 
community that is at the heart of the false-light “publicity” requirement.271 
                                                                                                                             
P.2d 611, 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a report to the IRS did not qualify as 
publicity). 
268.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1979) (discussing publicity given to 
private life). The Restatement explains: 
“Publicity,” [in privacy actions], differs from “publication,” . . . [in] defamation. 
“Publication,” . . . is a word of art, which includes any communication by the 
defendant to a third person. “Publicity,” on the other hand, means that the matter is 
made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that 
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public 
knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be 
oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication that reaches, or is 
sure to reach, the public. 
Id. § 652D cmt. a. 
269.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-125.5 (2006) (“Self-publication . . . shall not give 
rise to a claim for libel or slander against the person who originally communicated the 
defamatory statement.”); Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196 (Haw. 2002) 
(rejecting self-publication); White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 809 N.E.2d 
1034, 1037 (Mass. 2004) (same). But see Kuechle v. Life’s Companion P.C.A., Inc., 653 
N.W.2d 214, 219-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that where the defendant had reported 
the plaintiff’s alleged misconduct to the Nurse’s Board, the plaintiff had no reasonable means 
to avoid self-publishing the statement to a new employer). 
270.  Cf. Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (referring to the 
“largely discredited doctrine of ‘compelled republication’ or (more vividly) ‘self-defamation,’ 
which . . . [m]ost states . . . reject . . . as a basis for a tort claim,” and refusing to extend the 
principle into federal constitutional law). 
271.  A few cases have substantially departed from the “publicity” requirement in the 
parallel privacy action for disclosure of private facts (rather than false light). The cases hold 
that “[w]hen a special relationship exists, the public can include one person or small groups 
such as fellow employees, club members, church members, family or neighbors.” See 
Pachowitz v. Le Doux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 96 & n.9 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (citing cases and 
affirming in part a judgment based on disclosure to one person whom the defendant knew had 
“loose lips”). But see Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126 (S.C. 
1999) (rejecting the argument that if information eventually became public, a party who 
disclosed the information to only one person could be held liable for “sparking the flame”). 
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In addition, false-light invasion of privacy normally272 requires proof of 
“actual malice,”273 meaning that the defendant must have acted with a high 
degree of awareness of the probable falsity of a statement.274 This kind of 
proof will not commonly be available in erroneous scoring cases, but may be 
adduced in suits where the facts also establish scienter for a 
misrepresentation claim.275  
The actual-malice culpability requirement in false-light cases is likely to 
be more demanding than the corresponding fault requirement in defamation 
actions. At one time, strict liability was imposed for defamatory false 
statements.276 Today, however, proof that the defendant was at fault with 
respect to the falsity of a defamatory utterance is required in a wide range of 
cases. Public officials and public figures, suing with respect to their conduct, 
fitness, or role in their public capacity, must prove actual malice.277 Of 
course, it is unlikely that this rule will apply to many standardized testing 
errors since the persons who take such tests are typically neither public 
                                                                                                                             
272.  But see Am. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 674, 685 (S.D. Miss. 
2001) (recognizing false-light invasion of privacy under negligence theory), aff’d, 37 F. App’x 
714 (5th Cir. 2002); West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647-48 (Tenn. 
2001) (holding that in a false-light action asserted by a private plaintiff regarding a matter of 
private concern, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant publisher was negligent). 
273.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E(b) (1979) (stating that, for liability to 
be imposed, the plaintiff must prove that “the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the . . . 
[plaintiff] would be placed”); see also Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-
51 (1974) (finding no occasion to re-examine the actual malice requirement in false-light 
cases). 
274.  Cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (discussing the “actual 
malice” requirement in defamation and concluding that there must be “sufficient evidence to 
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his 
publication”). 
275.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
276.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. d (1979) (acknowledging that 
“strict liability as to the issue of falsity [was] imposed by the common law of defamation”). 
For example, in Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., [1929] 2 K.B. 331, a newspaper 
article said that Mr. Cassidy was engaged to a woman, which is what both Cassidy and the 
woman told the newspaper. Id. at 332-33. In fact, unknown to the newspaper, Cassidy was 
already married. Id. at 333. The court held the newspaper liable to Cassidy’s wife for 
defamation because her acquaintances believed, as a result of the article, that she was living 
with a man (Cassidy) to whom she was not married. Id. at 340-42. 
277.  See id. § 580A (“One who publishes a false and defamatory communication 
concerning a public official or public figure in regard to his conduct, fitness or role in that 
capacity is subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a) knows that the statement is false and that it 
defames the other person, or (b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters.”). 
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officials nor public figures who have achieved notoriety in the community.278 
More probably, the mis-scoring plaintiff will be a “private person” suing 
with respect to a matter of public concern (e.g., a student taking a test 
required by state law), or a person suing with respect to a matter of private 
concern (e.g., perhaps a student taking a standardized test for which the 
results will be reported only to a small number of private colleges or 
universities). In the former case (private person/matter of public concern––
for which the standards are set by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.279), Supreme 
Court precedent mandates that states not permit recovery of damages unless 
there is evidence that the defendant was at least negligent as to the falsity of 
the defamatory statement.280 As to cases in the latter group (a person suing 
with respect to a matter of private concern––where Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.281 is a key precedent), the Supreme Court has not 
definitively ruled on whether strict liability is permissible or whether 
negligence must be shown.282 Many states now require negligence.283 
Negligence as to falsity is considerably easier to prove than actual malice.284 
Whether a defamation suit by a test-taker whose score is seriously 
understated is treated as involving a private person suing with respect to a 
                                                                                                                             
278.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (“Those who, by 
reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek 
the public’s attention, are properly classed as public figures.”). 
279.  418 U.S. 323. 
280.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (“[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, 
the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). But see Journal-
Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 1999) (holding that even private 
persons suing with respect to matters of public or general concern must prove actual malice). 
281.  472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
282.  Compare Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 774 (White, J., concurring) (“[I]t must 
be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is . . . 
inapplicable in cases such as this.”), with id. 472 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
parties [do not] question the requirement of Gertz that respondent must show fault to obtain a 
judgment and actual damages.”). See also Andersen v. Diorio, 349 F.3d 8, 17 n.4 (1st Cir. 
2003) (indicating that whether a negligence requirement applies to “statements against non-
public figures in matters of private concern is still formally unsettled”). 
283.  See, e.g., Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129, 143 (La. 2004) (requiring “lack of 
reasonable belief in the truth of the statement giving rise to the defamation,” which is “akin to 
negligence”); see also Zaidi v. United Bank Ltd., 747 N.Y.S.2d 268, 273 (Sup. Ct. 2002) 
(stating that the “New York Court of Appeals has yet to establish what degree of fault, if any, 
plaintiff is required to prove in cases involving a purely private plaintiff and speech 
implicating purely private concerns,” but that the Appellate Division has required negligence). 
284.  Cf. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 991-92 (discussing the great difficulty of 
proving actual malice in reporting). 
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matter of public concern (a Gertz285 case), or simply a person suing with 
respect to a matter of private concern (a Dun & Bradstreet286 case), has 
important implications not only with respect to culpability, but whether 
damages must be proved. At common law, all libel (generally written 
defamation287) was actionable per se,288 as were four categories of slander289 
(generally oral defamation290), including statements imputing incompetence 
in business, trade or profession.291 This meant that a jury could award 
“presumed damages,” without proof of actual losses.292 Under the rule of 
presumed damages––which was a great departure from the usual standards of 
tort liability––the jury could look to the nastiness of the statement, and the 
degree of its dissemination, and presume an amount of damages that would 
fairly compensate the plaintiff. Thus, many sizeable awards were made 
without any precise proof of what losses actually occurred.293 During the 
process of reconciling the ancient law of libel and slander294 with the 
                                                                                                                             
285.  418 U.S. 323. 
286.  472 U.S. 749. 
287.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (1979) (“Libel consists of the 
publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical 
form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities 
characteristic of written or printed words.”). 
288.  See id. § 569 (“One who falsely publishes matter defamatory of another in such a 
manner as to make the publication a libel is subject to liability to the other although no special 
harm results from the publication.”). 
289.  See id. § 570 (“One who publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner 
as to make the publication a slander is subject to liability to the other although no special harm 
results if the publication imputes to the other (a) a criminal offense, . . . or (b) a loathsome 
disease, . . . or (c) matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession, or office, . . . or (d) 
serious sexual misconduct . . . .”). 
290.  See id. § 568(2) (“Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by 
spoken words, transitory gestures or by any form of communication other than [libel].”). 
291.  See id. § 573 (“One who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct, 
characteristics or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of 
his lawful business, trade or profession, or of his public or private office, whether honorary or 
for profit, is subject to liability without proof of special harm.”). 
292.  See, e.g., Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Iowa 1998) 
(“When statements are libelous per se, they are actionable in and of themselves without proof 
of malice, falsity, or damage.”). 
293.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (discussing the 
traditional rules pertaining to libel). 
294.  See Kay L. Reamey, Casenote, Torts––Defamation––Private Figure Plaintiff 
Must Show Not Only Fault as to Falsity But Also Falsity Itself to Recover Damages for 
Defamatory Statements Made by Media Defendant on Matters of Public Concern, 18 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 581, 585 (1986) (“In response to the violence that accompanied the transition 
from a feudal order to a capitalist nation-state during the sixteenth century, the law of the 
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demands of the First Amendment,295 which began with New York Times v. 
Sullivan,296 the Supreme Court “roughly bisected the sphere of social 
commentary between matters of public concern, which are those that can be 
‘fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community,’ and matters of private concern, which are those 
that address ‘matters of only personal interest.’”297 The Supreme Court held 
that a Gertz-type plaintiff298 (a private person suing with regard to a matter of 
public concern) could not recover presumed damages without proof of actual 
malice.299 In contrast, a Dun & Bradstreet-type plaintiff300 (a person suing 
with respect to a matter of purely private concern) was still allowed to 
recover presumed damages under the traditional rules, even in the absence of 
actual malice.301 Consequently, damages issues relating to a defamation 
claim in standardized test mis-scoring cases may be greatly affected 
depending upon whether the false statement is viewed as a matter of purely 
private concern, rather than a matter of public concern. In that situation, 
proof of actual losses will not be required. 
What qualifies as a matter of private concern is often unclear,302 and 
many persons doubt whether courts can or should attempt to define what 
matters are legitimately of concern to the public.303 In Dun & Bradstreet,304 
                                                                                                                             
Court of Star Chamber proscribed both seditious and nonpolitical libel. . . . During this time, 
common law tribunals obtained jurisdiction of civil actions for slanderous attacks on 
reputation and awarded money damages for secular losses.” (footnotes omitted)). 
295.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”). 
296.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
297.  Veilleux v. NBC, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 23, 34 (D. Me. 1998) (quoting Levinsky’s, 
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 132 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
298.  See 418 U.S. 323. 
299.  See id. at 349 (stating rule). 
300.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
301.  See id. at 761 (“In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no 
matters of public concern, . . . the state interest [in compensating defamatory harm] adequately 
supports awards of presumed and punitive damages––even absent a showing of ‘actual 
malice.’”). 
302.  See Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 471 (Ind. 1999) 
(Boehm, J., concurring) (“[D]rawing a line between matters of public and private concern may 
prove to be problematic. Over time, however, guidelines will emerge . . . .”); Duracraft Corp. 
v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 941 n.14 (Mass. 1998) (“Distinguishing matters of 
public from matters of private concern is not always clear-cut.”). 
303.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (“We doubt the wisdom of committing this task [of 
differentiating public concern from private concern] to the conscience of judges.”); 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining 
that if “courts are not simply to take a poll to determine whether a substantial portion of the 
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the Supreme Court re-embraced the public concern/private concern 
dichotomy that it had rejected just a few years earlier,305 and surprisingly306 
held that an erroneous statement about whether a major employer in the 
community was going bankrupt was a matter of private concern because the 
statement was contained in a credit report that was distributed to a very 
limited number of subscribers.307 In light of that ruling, standardized test 
results reported confidentially to a small number of private schools––in 
contrast to standardized testing results in the public education, which are 
often publicly available––might fall within that “private concern” 
category.308 In defamation cases generally, courts are far more likely to label 
                                                                                                                             
population is interested or concerned in a subject, courts will be required to somehow pass on 
the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject,” even though courts “are not 
anointed with any extraordinary prescience”). 
304.  472 U.S. 749. 
305.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (“The public or general interest test for determining 
the applicability of the New York Times [actual malice] standard to private defamation actions 
inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake.” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
306.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 1006. The text states: 
Dun & Bradstreet provides little guidance for distinguishing matters of private 
concern from matters of public concern. Indeed, the Court’s application of the law to 
the facts before it seems somewhat counter-intuitive. The credit report had 
erroneously said that the plaintiff had declared voluntary bankruptcy. Isn’t it a matter 
of public concern whether a business which employs numerous workers and pays 
taxes is failing? The Court appeared to place weight on the fact that the erroneous 
credit report was given limited dissemination and that the five subscribers who 
received the report were contractually precluded from further disseminating its 
contents. The Court also suggested that the reporting of “objectively verifiable 
information” deserved less constitutional protection than other kinds of speech, and 
that market forces gave credit-reporting agencies an incentive to be accurate, “since 
false credit reporting is of no use to creditors.” 
Id. 
307.  See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (“‘[W]hether . . . speech addresses a 
matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and context . 
. . as revealed by the whole record.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983))). 
308.  Some types of evaluations, or at least the protests related thereto, qualify as 
matters of private concern. See Alaniz v. City of Sullivan, No. C.A. B-04-40, 2005 WL 
1651021, at *7 n.3 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2005) (“‘[P]ublic employees raise matters of public 
concern if they criticize the special attention paid by the police to a wealthy neighborhood, or 
the implementation of a federally funded reading program. . . . [T]he quality of nursing care 
given to a group of people, including inmates, is a matter of public concern, as is the adequacy 
of a fire department’s level of manpower. However, public employees raise matters of 
“private concern” if they criticize the morale problems or transfer policies of the district 
attorney’s office; or criticize the performance of co-employees and supervisors; or protest an 
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a statement as a “matter of public concern” or a “matter of private concern,” 
than to explain their reasoning behind that conclusion or identify relevant 
variables.309 
As yet, there is little guidance from courts directly addressing 
defamation or false-light claims based on standardized test scoring errors, 
although a recent case declined to hold as a matter of law that “misreported 
test scores can never give rise to a claim for defamation.”310 One of the 
unresolved questions is whether a claim for libel or slander against a testing 
agency can be defeated by a qualified privilege.311 Regardless of the attacks 
on standardized testing,312 many would argue that such evaluative 
instruments serve a useful purpose, and therefore a testing agency’s good 
faith communication of test scores––even if erroneous––should be 
qualifiedly privileged. A qualified privilege is lost when the privilege is 
abused.313 One form of abuse is dissemination of a statement with knowledge 
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth.314 This means that 
qualified privileges will play no role in cases alleging defamation or false-
light against testing agencies, if the plaintiff must prove actual malice. That 
is, proof of the plaintiff’s prima facie case would by necessity destroy a 
qualified privilege. However, as explained above, it is likely that in many 
libel or slander mis-scoring suits the plaintiff will qualify as a “private” 
person, and will therefore only need to prove that the defendant testing 
agency acted with negligence as to the falsity of the report. In such cases, it 
may be possible for a qualified privilege to defeat the plaintiff’s proof of a 
prima facie case.315 
                                                                                                                             
employer’s unfavorable job evaluation.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Kirkland v. Northside 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 n.10 (5th Cir. 1989))).  
309.  But see Levinsky’s, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 137, 140-43 (D. 
Me. 1998) (analyzing why a retail store manager’s statement to the author of a magazine 
article about a competitor was a matter of public concern). 
310.  Russo v. NCS Pearson, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1000 (D. Minn. 2006). 
311.  See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
312.  See supra Part I.B. 
313.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 599-605A (1979) (discussing abuse of 
privilege). 
314.  See id. § 600 (stating rule); see also Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 992 P.2d 1111, 
1114 (Alaska 1999) (stating rule). 
315.  Cf. Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 377 A.2d 807, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1977) (holding that a report to the Unemployment Compensation Commission 
concerning the plaintiffs’ discharge, though false and defamatory, was qualifiedly privileged 
because, although the defendant may have been negligent as to the falsity of the statements, 
the statements were not made with knowledge of their inaccuracy or reckless indifference as 
to whether they were correct), modified, 397 A.2d 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 
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D.  Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage 
The twin torts of interference with contract316 and interference with 
prospective advantage317 safeguard contractual and other valuable 
expectations “and thereby . . . nurture, if not ensure, the stability and 
predictability that are necessary . . . for . . . commercial life” and personal 
achievement.318 It is reasonable to ask whether standardized test scoring 
errors are actionable under either of these theories of liability. 
An erroneous standardized test score will seldom disrupt an existing 
contractual relationship.319 People typically do not administer tests to 
determine whether to maintain the status quo. Rather, tests are more 
commonly used to determine whether a person will cross a threshold leading 
to a new status or arrangement. Thus, mis-scoring most often will interfere 
by causing the loss of future advantages, such as admission to a school, 
receipt of a scholarship, or attainment of a degree or license. Obviously, 
understated test scores can cause damage because when scores are too low, 
benefits are often not conferred. In the types of educational and professional 
evaluations where standardized test scores play a role, the offer of a valuable 
opportunity, such as admission or employment, many times goes to the more 
highly scoring competitor. 
                                                                                                                             
316.  Interference with contract has two branches—complete disruption of the 
plaintiff’s or a third person’s performance and burdening the plaintiff’s performance. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (“One who intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third 
person to perform the contract.”); id. § 766A (“One who intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person, by 
preventing the other from performing the contract or causing his performance to be more 
expensive or burdensome, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to 
him.”). 
317.  Id. § 766B (“One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another’s 
prospective contractual relation . . . is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm 
resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of (a) 
inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective 
relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.”). 
318.  Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners 
and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 75 (1988) 
(discussing tortious interference with law firm client relationships). 
319.  But see Merrick v. Thomas, 522 N.W.2d 402 (Neb. 1994). For a brief discussion 
of the Merrick case, see supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text. 
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The first obstacle for a mis-scoring plaintiff is that the interference 
actions are exclusively intentional torts.320 Merely negligent interference is 
not actionable,321 except in the rarest of cases.322 To recover for interference, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to disrupt an existing or 
future relationship between the plaintiff and a third party. Intent encompasses 
purpose and knowledge.323 It is exceedingly unlikely that a test-taker or other 
aggrieved party will be able to show that an erroneous standardized test score 
was disseminated with the purpose––the goal, objective, or desired 
consequence––of interfering with an existing or prospective relation between 
the plaintiff and some third person. Thus, a critical question will often be 
whether the other variety of intent––knowledge––will be applicable. This 
requires asking whether the defendant knew with substantial certainty that its 
conduct would induce or otherwise cause disruption. 
If a testing agency provides a very low test score directly to a college or 
university where a test-taker seeks admission, it may be possible for a court 
to find that the testing agency knew with substantial certainty that the student 
would not be admitted. The same is true where the testing agency is aware 
that a particular score is too low for a student to pass a government-mandated 
examination, such as those administered pursuant to the federal No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001.324 In such cases, if the testing agency is to be saved 
from liability, it will be on some ground other than lack of intent––perhaps 
lack of a legally protectable interest on the part of the plaintiff, lack of 
impropriety,325 or some kind of privilege (all of which are discussed below).  
                                                                                                                             
320.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j (1979); id. § 766A 
cmt. e; id. § 767 cmt. d. Each of these sections discuss intent and purpose. 
321.  See id. § 766C (“One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving 
from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor’s negligently (a) causing a 
third person not to perform a contract with the other, or (b) interfering with the other’s 
performance of his contract or making the performance more expensive or burdensome, or (c) 
interfering with the other’s acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.”). 
322.  See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 62 (Cal. 1979) (allowing an 
action against a contractor who failed to complete a structural renovation in a timely fashion). 
323.  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 155, § 1 (“A person acts with the intent to produce 
a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) 
the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result.”). 
324.  Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
325.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. j (1979) (“The fact that . . . 
interference with the other’s contract was not desired and was purely incidental in character is 
. . . a factor to be considered in determining whether the interference is improper.”); see also 
id. § 767 (discussing the many factors bearing upon impropriety).  
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Of course, an erroneous test score may not be so bad that the test agency 
“knows” what will happen when the score is received. For example, it may 
be wholly unclear whether an applicant for admission to the bar will be 
admitted in a particular jurisdiction when an erroneous Multistate Bar 
Examination (MBE) score is disseminated. That score may have to be 
combined with an unknown score on an essay graded by law examiners to 
arrive at a scaled total score, which then determines whether the aspirant will 
be allowed to practice law. By mis-scoring the MBE, the testing agency may 
have created an unreasonable risk that the bar applicant will not be admitted, 
but there is an important difference between unreasonableness (negligence or 
recklessness) and intent.326 Anything less than intent as to the result that the 
law forbids––that is, intent as to resulting interference with a contract or 
prospective advantage––will not do. 
According to the Restatement, there is liability both for disrupting an 
existing contract, and for burdening the performance of the contract, such as 
by making fulfillment of contractual obligations more difficult or 
expensive.327 Some courts have endorsed the “burdening rationale,” but 
others have not.328 Importantly, some courts have extended the burdening 
                                                                                                                             
326.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 554 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1996) (finding that no viable claim was stated where a complaint alleged that a state 
university was directly responsible for placing tickets in the hands of scalpers, but failed to 
charge that the state university took those actions for the purpose of interfering with contracts 
between tourists and tour operators); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethics of 
Communicating with Putative Class Members, 17 REV. LITIG. 497, 521 (1998) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Ethics of Communicating] (“The law of tortious interference safeguards interests in a 
relationship from unprivileged purposeful or knowing disruption by a person outside the 
relationship.”).  
327.  See supra note 316. 
328.  See Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 615 (Wyo. 1989) (refusing to adopt 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766A (1979)). In Price, a debtor’s attorney allegedly 
interfered with the contractual relationship between the creditor (a hospital) and its attorney 
(Price) by sending a letter to the hospital questioning its wisdom in hiring Price. Id. The 
hospital did not discharge Price, but Price alleged that he was forced to incur expenses to 
restore good relations with the hospital. Id. The court wrote:  
§ 766A requires, not a breach or non-performance, but only that performance 
[becomes] more expensive and burdensome. . . . [S]uch an element of proof is too 
speculative and subject to abuse to provide a meaningful basis for a cause of action. 
The breach or non-performance of a contract, or the loss of a prospective contractual 
relation, is a reasonably bright line that reduces the potential for abuse of the causes 
of action defined by §§ 766 and 766B. 
Id. at 616; see also Windsor Sec., Inc. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 655, 659-63 (3d Cir. 
1993) (declining to decide whether Pennsylvania would recognize tortious interference based 
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theory of liability to cases involving interference with prospective 
advantage.329 Thus, even though the Restatement does not recognize liability 
for burdening absent an existing contract,330 that theory might be argued in a 
mis-scoring case. An aggrieved test-taker might contend that even if a testing 
agency did not know that admission to a grade level or an educational 
program, or conferral of a scholarship, degree or license, would be denied, it 
did know that the score would burden the performance or acquisition of that 
advantageous relation. Testing agencies should expect to encounter this type 
of argument. 
It might be possible to ask again, as with fraud,331 whether the conduct 
that forms the basis for the allegedly tortious interference could be viewed 
not as the initial dissemination of erroneous results, but as the failure to 
correct those misstatements once their falsity is known. In tort law, acts and 
omissions are sometimes,332 but not always,333 equivalent. Thus, it is fair to 
ask whether failure to retract an erroneous score could be a form of 
interference, even if the original publication of the statement was not. In 
defamation law, failure to remove defamatory postings by another is 
sometimes treated as being the same as affirmative publication of the 
damaging material.334 Nevertheless, the failure-to-retract argument lacks 
appeal. Most interference cases involve some active form of intervention,335 
                                                                                                                             
on “burdens” or “hindrances,” but containing an extensive discussion casting doubt on that 
theory of liability). 
329.  See, e.g., LaRouche v. NBC, Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1136, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding the defendant liable for expenses entailed by unsuccessful interference with a 
television interview, which ultimately took place). 
330.  See supra note 316. 
331.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
332.  See, e.g., UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(b) (1996) (defining “fault” as “acts 
or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless”). 
333.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 86, at 443-69 (explaining that with respect to 
intervening causes, acts are more likely than omissions to break the chain of proximate 
causation); Johnson, Americans Abroad, supra note 95, at 348 (“The law continues to draw an 
important distinction between doing something badly (misfeasance) and not doing it at all 
(nonfeasance). The former often gives rise to liability because one who acts must act 
reasonably, but the latter may go unpunished on the ground that the defendant had no duty to 
act to protect the interests of the plaintiff.”). 
334.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1979) (“One who intentionally 
and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or 
chattels in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued 
publication.”). 
335.  Cf. Johnson, Ethics of Communicating, supra note 326, at 521 (“The law of 
tortious interference safeguards interests in a relationship from unprivileged purposeful or 
knowing disruption by a person outside the relationship.”).  
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such as changing contract bidding rules,336 cancelling a score,337 or extending 
an offer of employment.338 The interference is an act that, in a real sense, 
intrudes and disrupts some existing or prospective relation. Passivity may be 
tortious on some other theory, but at least in the absence of a request to 
retract, it is dubious whether passive failure to correct should constitute 
“interference.” 
A “prospective contractual relationship” is “something less than a right” 
but “more than hope.”339 An action for tortious interference with prospective 
advantage will lie only if there is a reasonable probability that a benefit or 
opportunity would have been conferred but for the interference.340 It will be 
difficult to establish this level of certainty in many cases.341 In one suit, 
where the plaintiff sued for tortious interference with her application to 
medical schools, the court denied recovery because, although the applicant 
“had a satisfactory academic record and background, she had not 
demonstrated more than a mere hope in securing a prospective relationship 
with a medical school.”342 “If it is a matter of speculation whether a 
                                                                                                                             
336.  See Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 40 (N.J. 1989) 
(finding that a claim was stated for tortious interference with prospective advantage). 
337.  See Johnson v. Educ. Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that 
a testing agency’s cancellation of a suspected fraudulent test score was justified and therefore 
not actionable as tortious interference). 
338.  See Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) (involving an opera star 
who was induced to breach her exclusive-engagement contract). 
339.  Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979). 
340.  See Printing Mart-Morristown, 563 A.2d at 41 (holding that there was a 
“reasonable probability” that, but for defendants’ conduct, the plaintiffs would have been 
awarded the printing component of a contract because they submitted the lowest bid for the 
entire job, the lowest bid for the printing component, and had “enjoyed a nine-year working 
relationship” with the party in question); see also Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 
1368, 1392 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a medical school applicant failed to demonstrate 
“reasonable probability” of acceptance). 
341.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (Ill. 1996) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s allegation that she was the “leading candidate” for a new job was 
insufficient to support her claim of intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage); Strickland v. Univ. of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 985 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (finding 
that the plaintiff had “not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on the question of 
whether it was reasonably probable that his contract with the University would have been 
renewed in the absence” of alleged interference). But see Tarleton State Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 
S.W.2d 948, 952 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that a professor showed a reasonable probability 
of entering into a future business relationship with a state university to support his claim for 
tortious interference with future business relationships resulting from the denial of tenure). 
342.   Nathanson, 926 F.2d at 1392 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the court 
explained: 
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relationship will come to fruition, there is no cause of action for tortious 
interference with prospective advantage.”343 
Interference is not actionable unless it is improper. The general test for 
impropriety is essentially a “totality of the circumstances” inquiry, which 
takes into account, among other things, “the nature of the actor’s conduct, . . 
. the actor’s motive, . . . the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, . . . 
the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and, . . . 
the relations between the parties.”344 “Fraudulent misrepresentations are . . . 
ordinarily a wrongful means of interference and make an interference 
improper.”345 However, the same may not be true of negligent 
misrepresentation, and there may be serious doubts as to whether 
dissemination of negligently false standardized test results will qualify as 
improper. In addition, the privileges that may defeat defamation and privacy 
actions also apply to interference cases.346 
E.  Injurious Falsehood 
Injurious falsehood, sometimes called “disparagement,” is a theory of 
tort liability that is neither much discussed nor well understood, despite its 
having been part of American law for so long that its principles were 
                                                                                                                             
[I]t was difficult to determine whether or not Nathanson would have been accepted by 
a medical school. In 1985, she applied to ten medical schools and was accepted only 
by [one]. In 1986, she applied to six medical schools and was accepted only by 
Georgetown which had rejected her when she had applied there the year before. 
Based upon this history, it is too speculative to conclude that she would have been 
accepted by any medical school in 1987 or 1989.  
Admissions policies vary considerably from school-to-school and from year-to-
year. Other information is simply not known.  
Id. 
343.  Johnson, Ethics of Communicating, supra note 326, at 523 (“Counsel for an 
uncertified class has no more than a hope that a relationship will be consummated with 
unnamed putative class members, for it is entirely speculative whether the court (after 
considering the requirements of numerosity, typicality, commonality, and representativeness) 
will certify the class and whether those putative members (after being apprised of the [class] 
action and available opportunities) will elect to opt out of the class.” (footnote omitted)). 
Therefore, the relation would not be protected by the law of tortious interference. Id. 
344.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).  
345.  Id. § 767 cmt. c. 
346.  “Tortious employee conduct which is otherwise actionable may be privileged on 
public policy grounds if the conduct is in furtherance of some interest of societal importance.” 
Wolf v. F & M Banks, 534 N.W.2d 877, 885-86 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on the 
common-interest conditional privilege to dispose of a tortious interference claim). 
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embodied in both the Restatement (First) of Torts and the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts347 and continue to be applied by courts today.348 More 
familiar to American lawyers than the overarching theory of injurious 
falsehood are its two principal subcategories, “trade libel” and “slander of 
title,” which are similar in many respects to defamation. An action for trade 
libel provides relief for pecuniary harm caused by false statements about the 
“quality of” the plaintiff’s “land, chattels or intangible things.”349 Slander of 
title, in contrast, offers a remedy for disparaging statements about plaintiff’s 
“property rights” in the same array of interests––land, chattels, and 
intangible things.350 
 It is not necessary to force the facts of a case involving erroneous 
standardized test scores into the theories of relief offered by trade libel or 
slander of title, for the law of injurious falsehood is broader.351 According to 
the second Restatement, 
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is 
subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if 
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to 
interests of the other having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
recognize that it is likely to do so, and 
                                                                                                                             
347.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A-652 (1979) (discussing liability 
for injurious falsehood, including slander of title and trade libel); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS §§ 624-652 (1932) (discussing liability for disparagement, including slander of title and 
trade libel). 
348.  See, e.g., Mayflower Transit, LLC v. Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362, 379 (D.N.J. 
2004) (finding there was a question of fact as to whether statements posted on the Internet by 
a disgruntled customer constituted trade libel); Wharton v. Tri-State Drilling & Boring, 824 
A.2d 531, 537 (Vt. 2003) (finding that landowners established slander of title where a 
company falsely and maliciously published a mechanics’ lien regarding the title to their 
home). 
349.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 626 (1979). 
350.  Id. § 624. 
351.  Id. § 623A cmt. a (stating that while the theory of injurious falsehood is “applied 
chiefly in cases of the disparagement of property in land, chattels or intangible things or of 
their quality. . . . [i]t is equally applicable to other publications of false statements that do 
harm to interests of another having pecuniary value”). One of the illustrations offered by the 
Restatement involves the reporting of test results, albeit in a medical context: 
A, a physician employed by B Company, examines C, a workman employed by the 
Company after an accident. Knowing that his statement is false, A reports to B 
Company that C is not seriously injured, as a result of which C is compelled to bring 
suit to recover his workmen’s compensation and suffers pecuniary loss through the 
expenses of suit. A is subject to liability to C. 
Id. § 623A illus. 5. 
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(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity.352 
Undoubtedly, the dissemination of an erroneous standardized test score 
is a false statement that may be harmful to the pecuniary interests of the test-
taker. In addition, a testing agency “should recognize” that an erroneous test-
score report is likely to cause just that type of harm. The only difficulty with 
suing on the theory of injurious falsehood would seem to be the final 
requirement concerning culpability, which imposes an obstacle equivalent353 
to scienter in fraud354 and actual malice in defamation355 and false-light 
invasion of privacy356––namely, knowledge of the statement’s falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth.357 It seems likely that only the rare scoring-
error case will offer this type of evidence. If such proof is available, does an 
action for injurious falsehood offer any advantage over suing for fraud or 
defamation? Perhaps. 
Unlike fraud, injurious falsehood imposes no requirements of intending 
to induce or actually causing reliance by the plaintiff. All that needs to be 
proved is that the false statement in fact caused harm as a result of actions by 
a third party.358 This simplifies the litigation process and increases the 
likelihood of recovery by removing one issue from consideration by the 
judge and jury.  
                                                                                                                             
352.  Id. § 623A. 
353.  See id. § 623A cmt. d (indicating the equivalence of scienter, actual malice, and 
the culpability requirement in injurious falsehood). 
354.  See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
355.  See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. 
356.  See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text. 
357.  Cf. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 465 A.2d 953, 963-64 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1983) (holding that while a lab had a duty not to communicate false information 
about the plaintiff’s product and could be liable for defamation or product disparagement, 
there was no clear and convincing evidence that it in fact entertained any serious doubts as to 
the accuracy of the test results), aff’d, 486 A.2d 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 
516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986).  
358.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. b (1979) (“[I]t is not 
necessary that his statement be published for the purpose of influencing the conduct of some 
third person or with knowledge that it is certain or substantially certain to do so. The publisher 
must, however, know enough of the circumstances so that he should as a reasonable man 
recognize the likelihood that some third person will act in reliance upon his statement, or that 
it will otherwise cause harm to the pecuniary interests of the other because of the reliance.”). 
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It is less clear that injurious falsehood is more favorable to test score 
plaintiffs than defamation.359 Many of the same privileges that apply to libel 
and slander apply to injurious falsehood.360 The chief advantage of suing for 
injurious falsehood would seem to be the elimination of the issue of whether 
the mis-scoring was of such magnitude as to disgrace the plaintiff.361 This 
may be useful to some plaintiffs. A student performing at the top range of 
test results (e.g., one who earned 2200 on the SAT, but was erroneously 
reported to have achieved only 2100) might have difficulty arguing that the 
error in imputed incompetence to the student otherwise subjected the student 
to the type of ridicule and humiliation that is defamatory. Yet on the same 
facts it might be possible to produce evidence showing that the understated 
result caused pecuniary harm, for example, by dropping the plaintiff into a 
less-generous scholarship category. 
However, the biggest difference between injurious falsehood and 
defamation is the culpability requirement, and in that regard a defamation 
claim may have a decided advantage. As noted previously,362 most test-takers 
will be treated as private persons who are not required to prove actual 
malice, but only negligence, in a suit for libel or slander. In addition, 
emotional distress damages are available for libel or slander,363 but not for 
injurious falsehood, where compensatory damages “have consistently been 
limited to harm to interests of the plaintiff having pecuniary value, and to 
proved pecuniary loss.”364 
False-light invasion of privacy and injurious falsehood would seem to be 
roughly comparable theories. In each, the plaintiff would face the great 
hurdle of proving actual malice or the equivalent, and in neither would it be 
necessary to prove that the erroneous statement was disgraceful. Essentially 
the same privileges that apply to false-light invasion of privacy apply to 
injurious falsehood. 
                                                                                                                             
359.  See id. § 623A cmt. g (discussing the relationship of injurious falsehood to 
defamation). 
360.  See id. § 646A (indicating which rules on conditional privilege to publish 
defamatory matter are applicable to injurious falsehood). 
361.  See supra notes 252, 265 and accompanying text. 
362.  See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text. 
363.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that recovery 
for “actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. . . . [and includes] impairment of 
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and 
suffering”). 
364.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A cmt. f (1979). 
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IV.  GUARDING, BUT NOT CLOSING, THE COURTHOUSE DOORS 
Courts have recognized that there are a number of competing interests at 
stake when the validity of standardized test scores is at issue. Thus, one 
court, in the context of a teacher certification test, wrote: 
[The test-taker] has a legitimate interest in assuring that she is not stripped of 
a valid test score. [The testing agency] has an interest in assuring the 
accuracy of the test results it reports and the predictions it thereby makes. 
The other test-takers are entitled to assurance that no examinee enjoys an 
unfair advantage in scoring. The school officials to whom test results are 
certified need to be assured that all reported test results are reliable. Finally, 
the public at large has an interest in assuring that all persons certified as 
teachers have in fact fulfilled the requirements of that certification.365 
Tort law offers an appropriate vehicle for balancing these types of 
competing interests. It is important for courts to consider carefully cases 
seeking compensation for the harm that results from mis-scoring errors, for 
the stakes are high. Some tort claims, supported by proper facts, will have 
merit, and other claims will not. If liability is imposed too readily, important 
testing institutions may be harmed or driven out of business, and those who 
rely on their services may be seriously disadvantaged. On the other hand, if 
liability is never assessed, blameworthy conduct may go undeterred and 
innocent victims of mis-scoring may be denied all recourse.  
The answer to minimizing and distributing the losses that result from the 
mis-scoring problems associated with standardized testing lies neither in 
barring the courthouse door, nor in throwing it open indiscriminately. Rather, 
there must be a painstaking review of the facts of each case in light of the 
principles of tort liability that have emerged from the common law. 
American tort law, in its multiple theories of liability, reflects not only 
current public sentiment, but often the wisdom of centuries of development. 
Tort law has the potential to provide valuable incentives for the exercise of 
care in standardized test scoring and to compensate harm in meritorious 
cases, while at the same time rejecting claims that are undeserving or that 
would impose undue burdens on testing agencies. 
                                                                                                                             
365.  Scott v. Educ. Testing Serv., 600 A.2d 500, 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
